Merge T-016 Sense audit relay

Implements immutable Bell audit storage and fenced Sense Outbox delivery.
2026-08-11 00:26:08 +08:00
parent aca22f4667 4be2386421
commit 2b9a59fe8a
35 changed files with 2188 additions and 42 deletions
@@ -1,13 +1,21 @@
-# Bell 事件存储基础
+# Bell 事件存储与内部审计入口

-Bell 当前只实现 M3 的事件域基础，不包含可部署 HTTP 服务：
+Bell 当前实现 M3 的事件域基础及 Sense 审计 relay 的最小内部 HTTP 服务：

 - Bell 在可信 ingress 内为不含 `id` 的候选事实生成 `evt_` ULID。
 - 最终事件同时通过冻结 v0.1 JSON Schema 与六项代码级断言。
 - PostgreSQL `bell.events` 保存不可变事实；后续 outcome 追加到 `bell.event_outcomes`。
- `bell_runtime` 只拥有两张表的 `SELECT/INSERT`，没有 `UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE` 或 migration owner 权限。
+- `bell_runtime` 对三张不可变事实表只有 `SELECT/INSERT`，没有 `UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE` 或 migration owner 权限；仅可在短期 `audit_relay_receipts` 表查询、插入和清理过期收据。
+- `cmd/bell-api` 默认只监听 `127.0.0.1:8081`，接收 HMAC 签名的 `/internal/v1/audit-events:batch`，把脱敏设备操作事实追加到 `bell.audit_events`。
+- `(key_id, nonce)` 收据保存 10 分钟；相同摘要重放原结果，不同摘要返回冲突。非回环监听必须配置 TLS 证书和私钥。

-Brain→Bell transport、认证、公共事件 API、规则、Alert 和证据对象存储仍需后续任务冻结，不能把 `internal/event` 的 Go 类型当成公共网络协议。
+Brain→Bell transport、公共认证/事件 API、规则、Alert 和证据对象存储仍需后续任务冻结。审计 relay 只服务 Sense，不得把 `internal/event` 的 Go 类型或该 HMAC 适配器当成公共协议。
+
+启动内部 receiver 前必须私下设置 `BELL_DB_DSN` 和仓库外绝对路径 `BELL_AUDIT_KEYS_FILE`。远端监听还必须设置 `BELL_TLS_CERT_FILE`、`BELL_TLS_KEY_FILE`；仓库不保存 DSN、key 或证书：
+
+```powershell
+go -C Bell run ./cmd/bell-api
+```

 ## 验证

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"syscall"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
+
+	"yovision/bell/internal/audit"
+	"yovision/bell/internal/store"
+)
+
+var version = "dev"
+
+type configuration struct {
+	address string
+	dsn     string
+	keyFile string
+	tlsCert string
+	tlsKey  string
+}
+
+func main() {
+	logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
+	if err := run(logger); err != nil {
+		logger.Error("Bell stopped", "error", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+}
+
+func loadConfiguration() (configuration, error) {
+	value := configuration{
+		address: envOr("BELL_HTTP_ADDR", "127.0.0.1:8081"),
+		dsn:     os.Getenv("BELL_DB_DSN"),
+		keyFile: os.Getenv("BELL_AUDIT_KEYS_FILE"),
+		tlsCert: os.Getenv("BELL_TLS_CERT_FILE"),
+		tlsKey:  os.Getenv("BELL_TLS_KEY_FILE"),
+	}
+	if value.dsn == "" {
+		return configuration{}, errors.New("BELL_DB_DSN is required")
+	}
+	if value.keyFile == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(value.keyFile) {
+		return configuration{}, errors.New("BELL_AUDIT_KEYS_FILE must be an absolute external path")
+	}
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(value.address)
+	if err != nil {
+		return configuration{}, errors.New("invalid BELL_HTTP_ADDR")
+	}
+	ip := net.ParseIP(host)
+	loopback := host == "localhost" || (ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback())
+	if !loopback && (value.tlsCert == "" || value.tlsKey == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(value.tlsCert) || !filepath.IsAbs(value.tlsKey)) {
+		return configuration{}, errors.New("non-loopback Bell bind requires absolute TLS certificate and key paths")
+	}
+	if (value.tlsCert == "") != (value.tlsKey == "") {
+		return configuration{}, errors.New("Bell TLS certificate and key must be configured together")
+	}
+	return value, nil
+}
+
+func run(logger *slog.Logger) error {
+	cfg, err := loadConfiguration()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	pgConfig, err := pgx.ParseConfig(cfg.dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.New("invalid Bell postgres DSN")
+	}
+	if pgConfig.RuntimeParams == nil {
+		pgConfig.RuntimeParams = make(map[string]string)
+	}
+	pgConfig.RuntimeParams["application_name"] = "yovision-bell"
+	db := stdlib.OpenDB(*pgConfig)
+	db.SetMaxOpenConns(16)
+	db.SetMaxIdleConns(4)
+	db.SetConnMaxLifetime(30 * time.Minute)
+	defer db.Close()
+
+	ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
+	defer stop()
+	repository, err := store.OpenPostgres(ctx, db)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := repository.AuditRelayReady(ctx); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	keys, err := audit.LoadKeys(cfg.keyFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	handler, err := audit.NewHandler(repository, keys)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.Handle(audit.RelayPath, handler)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(writer http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		writeStatus(writer, http.StatusOK, "ok")
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /readyz", func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		if err := repository.AuditRelayReady(request.Context()); err != nil {
+			writeStatus(writer, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "not_ready")
+			return
+		}
+		writeStatus(writer, http.StatusOK, "ready")
+	})
+	server := &http.Server{Addr: cfg.address, Handler: mux, ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, ReadTimeout: 15 * time.Second, WriteTimeout: 15 * time.Second, IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second, TLSConfig: &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}}
+	serverErrors := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		logger.Info("Bell listening", "address", cfg.address, "version", version, "tls_enabled", cfg.tlsCert != "")
+		if cfg.tlsCert != "" {
+			serverErrors <- server.ListenAndServeTLS(cfg.tlsCert, cfg.tlsKey)
+			return
+		}
+		serverErrors <- server.ListenAndServe()
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+	case serverErr := <-serverErrors:
+		if !errors.Is(serverErr, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("serve Bell HTTP: %w", serverErr)
+		}
+	}
+	shutdownContext, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	return server.Shutdown(shutdownContext)
+}
+
+func writeStatus(writer http.ResponseWriter, status int, value string) {
+	writer.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	writer.WriteHeader(status)
+	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(writer, `{"status":%q}`, value)
+}
+
+func envOr(name, fallback string) string {
+	if value := os.Getenv(name); value != "" {
+		return value
+	}
+	return fallback
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestConfigurationRequiresDatabaseAndExternalKey(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("BELL_DB_DSN", "")
+	t.Setenv("BELL_AUDIT_KEYS_FILE", "")
+	if _, err := loadConfiguration(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("missing Bell database was accepted")
+	}
+	t.Setenv("BELL_DB_DSN", "postgres://bell@127.0.0.1/yovision")
+	t.Setenv("BELL_AUDIT_KEYS_FILE", "relative.json")
+	if _, err := loadConfiguration(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("relative Bell key file was accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigurationRequiresTLSOutsideLoopback(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("BELL_DB_DSN", "postgres://bell@127.0.0.1/yovision")
+	t.Setenv("BELL_AUDIT_KEYS_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "keys.json"))
+	t.Setenv("BELL_HTTP_ADDR", "0.0.0.0:8081")
+	if _, err := loadConfiguration(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("remote plaintext Bell bind was accepted")
+	}
+	t.Setenv("BELL_TLS_CERT_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "server.crt"))
+	t.Setenv("BELL_TLS_KEY_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "server.key"))
+	if _, err := loadConfiguration(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("remote TLS Bell bind rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+// Package audit authenticates and validates Sense audit relay batches.
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"regexp"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+)
+
+const (
+	RelayPath       = "/internal/v1/audit-events:batch"
+	MaxBatchSize    = 100
+	MaxBodyBytes    = 1 << 20
+	HeaderKeyID     = "X-YoVision-Key-Id"
+	HeaderTimestamp = "X-YoVision-Timestamp"
+	HeaderNonce     = "X-YoVision-Nonce"
+	HeaderSignature = "X-YoVision-Signature"
+)
+
+var ErrReplayConflict = errors.New("audit relay replay conflict")
+
+type Actor struct {
+	Type string `json:"type"`
+	ID   string `json:"id"`
+}
+
+type ProjectionVersions struct {
+	QuotaSourceVersion      *int64 `json:"quota_source_version"`
+	AreaPolicySourceVersion *int64 `json:"area_policy_source_version"`
+}
+
+type Event struct {
+	EventID             string             `json:"event_id"`
+	EventType           string             `json:"event_type"`
+	TenantID            string             `json:"tenant_id"`
+	SiteID              string             `json:"site_id"`
+	DeviceID            string             `json:"device_id"`
+	Actor               Actor              `json:"actor"`
+	Reason              *string            `json:"reason"`
+	TraceID             *string            `json:"trace_id"`
+	AggregateGeneration int64              `json:"aggregate_generation"`
+	ProjectionVersions  ProjectionVersions `json:"projection_versions"`
+	Data                json.RawMessage    `json:"data"`
+	OccurredAt          time.Time          `json:"occurred_at"`
+}
+
+type Envelope struct {
+	SchemaVersion int   `json:"schema_version"`
+	Event         Event `json:"event"`
+}
+
+type Result struct {
+	EventID   string  `json:"event_id"`
+	Status    string  `json:"status"`
+	ErrorCode *string `json:"error_code,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type BatchResponse struct {
+	Results []Result `json:"results"`
+}
+
+type Candidate struct {
+	Envelope   Envelope
+	RecordHash [sha256.Size]byte
+	ErrorCode  string
+}
+
+type Repository interface {
+	ProcessAuditBatch(context.Context, string, string, [sha256.Size]byte, []Candidate) ([]Result, error)
+}
+
+type Handler struct {
+	repository Repository
+	keys       map[string][]byte
+	now        func() time.Time
+}
+
+func NewHandler(repository Repository, keys map[string][]byte) (*Handler, error) {
+	if repository == nil || len(keys) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("audit handler dependencies are required")
+	}
+	copyKeys := make(map[string][]byte, len(keys))
+	for id, secret := range keys {
+		if !keyIDPattern.MatchString(id) || len(secret) < 32 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid audit handler key")
+		}
+		copyKeys[id] = append([]byte(nil), secret...)
+	}
+	return &Handler{repository: repository, keys: copyKeys, now: time.Now}, nil
+}
+
+func (h *Handler) ServeHTTP(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+	if request.Method != http.MethodPost || request.URL.Path != RelayPath {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found")
+		return
+	}
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(request.Body, MaxBodyBytes+1))
+	if err != nil || len(body) > MaxBodyBytes {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "payload_too_large")
+		return
+	}
+	keyID := request.Header.Get(HeaderKeyID)
+	timestamp := request.Header.Get(HeaderTimestamp)
+	nonce := request.Header.Get(HeaderNonce)
+	provided := request.Header.Get(HeaderSignature)
+	secret, ok := h.keys[keyID]
+	seconds, timestampErr := strconv.ParseInt(timestamp, 10, 64)
+	nonceBytes, nonceErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(nonce)
+	signatureBytes, signatureErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(provided)
+	if !ok || timestampErr != nil || len(timestamp) < 10 || nonceErr != nil || len(nonceBytes) < 16 || len(nonceBytes) > 48 ||
+		signatureErr != nil || len(signatureBytes) != sha256.Size || absDuration(h.now().UTC().Sub(time.Unix(seconds, 0).UTC())) > 300*time.Second {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
+		return
+	}
+	expected := signature(secret, canonicalString(request.Method, request.URL.EscapedPath(), timestamp, nonce, body))
+	if !hmac.Equal(signatureBytes, expected) {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
+		return
+	}
+	candidates, err := decodeCandidates(body)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_batch")
+		return
+	}
+	requestHash := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	results, err := h.repository.ProcessAuditBatch(request.Context(), keyID, nonce, requestHash, candidates)
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrReplayConflict) {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusConflict, "replay_conflict")
+		return
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(writer, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "temporarily_unavailable")
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(writer, http.StatusOK, BatchResponse{Results: results})
+}
+
+func canonicalString(method, path, timestamp, nonce string, body []byte) string {
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	return strings.Join([]string{method, path, timestamp, nonce, hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}, "\n")
+}
+
+func signature(secret []byte, canonical string) []byte {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte(canonical))
+	return mac.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+func absDuration(value time.Duration) time.Duration {
+	if value < 0 {
+		return -value
+	}
+	return value
+}
+
+type rawBatch struct {
+	Events []json.RawMessage `json:"events"`
+}
+
+func decodeCandidates(body []byte) ([]Candidate, error) {
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(body))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var batch rawBatch
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&batch); err != nil || len(batch.Events) < 1 || len(batch.Events) > MaxBatchSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid audit batch")
+	}
+	var trailing any
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&trailing); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid audit batch trailing data")
+	}
+	values := make([]Candidate, len(batch.Events))
+	for index, raw := range batch.Events {
+		values[index].RecordHash = sha256.Sum256(raw)
+		if !hasExactEnvelopeShape(raw) {
+			values[index].ErrorCode = "schema_invalid"
+			continue
+		}
+		itemDecoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+		itemDecoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+		if err := itemDecoder.Decode(&values[index].Envelope); err != nil {
+			values[index].ErrorCode = "schema_invalid"
+			continue
+		}
+		values[index].ErrorCode = validateEnvelope(values[index].Envelope)
+	}
+	return values, nil
+}
+
+var (
+	eventIDPattern   = regexp.MustCompile(`^audit_[0-9a-f]{32}$`)
+	logicalIDPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$`)
+	keyIDPattern     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$`)
+)
+
+func validateEnvelope(value Envelope) string {
+	event := value.Event
+	if (value.SchemaVersion != 1 && value.SchemaVersion != 2) || !eventIDPattern.MatchString(event.EventID) ||
+		!logicalIDPattern.MatchString(event.TenantID) || !logicalIDPattern.MatchString(event.SiteID) || !logicalIDPattern.MatchString(event.DeviceID) ||
+		event.AggregateGeneration < 1 || event.OccurredAt.IsZero() || strings.TrimSpace(event.Actor.ID) == "" || utf8.RuneCountInString(event.Actor.ID) > 200 ||
+		(event.Actor.Type != "user" && event.Actor.Type != "service" && event.Actor.Type != "system") ||
+		(event.Reason != nil && utf8.RuneCountInString(*event.Reason) > 500) || (event.TraceID != nil && utf8.RuneCountInString(*event.TraceID) > 128) ||
+		(event.ProjectionVersions.QuotaSourceVersion != nil && *event.ProjectionVersions.QuotaSourceVersion < 1) ||
+		(event.ProjectionVersions.AreaPolicySourceVersion != nil && *event.ProjectionVersions.AreaPolicySourceVersion < 1) {
+		return "schema_invalid"
+	}
+	if event.EventType != "device.created" && event.EventType != "device.desired_state.accepted" &&
+		(event.EventType != "device.configuration.accepted" || value.SchemaVersion != 2) {
+		return "schema_invalid"
+	}
+	var data map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Data, &data); err != nil || data == nil {
+		return "schema_invalid"
+	}
+	expected := map[string]string{
+		"device.created":                "device_created",
+		"device.desired_state.accepted": "desired_state_accepted",
+		"device.configuration.accepted": "configuration_accepted",
+	}[event.EventType]
+	if data["kind"] != expected || !validateData(event.EventType, data) || containsSensitiveKey(data) {
+		return "payload_invalid"
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func hasExactEnvelopeShape(raw []byte) bool {
+	var envelope map[string]json.RawMessage
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &envelope); err != nil || !exactRawKeys(envelope, "schema_version", "event") {
+		return false
+	}
+	var event map[string]json.RawMessage
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(envelope["event"], &event); err != nil || !exactRawKeys(event,
+		"event_id", "event_type", "tenant_id", "site_id", "device_id", "actor", "reason", "trace_id",
+		"aggregate_generation", "projection_versions", "data", "occurred_at",
+	) {
+		return false
+	}
+	var actor, projections map[string]json.RawMessage
+	return json.Unmarshal(event["actor"], &actor) == nil && exactRawKeys(actor, "type", "id") &&
+		json.Unmarshal(event["projection_versions"], &projections) == nil && exactRawKeys(projections, "quota_source_version", "area_policy_source_version")
+}
+
+func exactRawKeys(value map[string]json.RawMessage, expected ...string) bool {
+	if len(value) != len(expected) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, key := range expected {
+		if _, exists := value[key]; !exists {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func validateData(eventType string, data map[string]any) bool {
+	switch eventType {
+	case "device.created":
+		if !exactAnyKeys(data, "kind", "area_id", "modality", "capabilities", "desired_state") || !logicalIDPattern.MatchString(stringValue(data["area_id"])) {
+			return false
+		}
+		if !member(stringValue(data["modality"]), "video", "radar", "contact", "button", "wearable", "other") || !member(stringValue(data["desired_state"]), "disabled", "enabled") {
+			return false
+		}
+		return validStringSet(data["capabilities"], 16, "video_capture", "audio_capture", "spatial_rule", "telemetry")
+	case "device.desired_state.accepted":
+		if !exactAnyKeys(data, "kind", "previous_desired_state", "desired_state", "changed") {
+			return false
+		}
+		_, changed := data["changed"].(bool)
+		return changed && member(stringValue(data["previous_desired_state"]), "disabled", "enabled") && member(stringValue(data["desired_state"]), "disabled", "enabled")
+	case "device.configuration.accepted":
+		if !exactAnyKeys(data, "kind", "changed", "changed_fields", "area_id") || !logicalIDPattern.MatchString(stringValue(data["area_id"])) {
+			return false
+		}
+		_, changed := data["changed"].(bool)
+		return changed && validStringSet(data["changed_fields"], 5, "name", "area_id", "endpoint_ref", "credential_ref", "profile_token")
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func exactAnyKeys(value map[string]any, expected ...string) bool {
+	if len(value) != len(expected) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, key := range expected {
+		if _, exists := value[key]; !exists {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func stringValue(value any) string {
+	result, _ := value.(string)
+	return result
+}
+
+func member(value string, allowed ...string) bool {
+	for _, candidate := range allowed {
+		if value == candidate {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func validStringSet(value any, maximum int, allowed ...string) bool {
+	items, ok := value.([]any)
+	if !ok || len(items) > maximum {
+		return false
+	}
+	seen := make(map[string]bool, len(items))
+	for _, item := range items {
+		text, ok := item.(string)
+		if !ok || !member(text, allowed...) || seen[text] {
+			return false
+		}
+		seen[text] = true
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func containsSensitiveKey(value any) bool {
+	forbidden := map[string]bool{"password": true, "stream_uri": true, "mediamtx_config": true}
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case map[string]any:
+		for key, child := range typed {
+			if forbidden[strings.ToLower(key)] || containsSensitiveKey(child) {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+	case []any:
+		for _, child := range typed {
+			if containsSensitiveKey(child) {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func writeError(writer http.ResponseWriter, status int, code string) {
+	writeJSON(writer, status, map[string]string{"error": code})
+}
+
+func writeJSON(writer http.ResponseWriter, status int, value any) {
+	writer.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	writer.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+	writer.WriteHeader(status)
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(writer).Encode(value)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type recordingRepository struct {
+	candidates []Candidate
+	results    []Result
+	err        error
+}
+
+func (r *recordingRepository) ProcessAuditBatch(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ [sha256.Size]byte, values []Candidate) ([]Result, error) {
+	r.candidates = values
+	return r.results, r.err
+}
+
+func validBody(t *testing.T) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	value := map[string]any{"events": []any{map[string]any{
+		"schema_version": 1,
+		"event": map[string]any{
+			"event_id": "audit_00000000000000000000000000000001", "event_type": "device.created",
+			"tenant_id": "tenant", "site_id": "site", "device_id": "camera-1",
+			"actor": map[string]any{"type": "system", "id": "sense"}, "reason": nil, "trace_id": nil,
+			"aggregate_generation": 1,
+			"projection_versions":  map[string]any{"quota_source_version": 1, "area_policy_source_version": 1},
+			"data":                 map[string]any{"kind": "device_created", "area_id": "area", "modality": "video", "capabilities": []any{"video_capture"}, "desired_state": "enabled"},
+			"occurred_at":          "2026-08-11T00:00:00Z",
+		},
+	}}}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return raw
+}
+
+func signedRequest(t *testing.T, body, secret []byte, timestamp time.Time, nonce string) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+	request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, RelayPath, bytes.NewReader(body))
+	stamp := strconv.FormatInt(timestamp.Unix(), 10)
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderKeyID, "sense-a")
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderTimestamp, stamp)
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderNonce, nonce)
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderSignature, base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature(secret, canonicalString(http.MethodPost, RelayPath, stamp, nonce, body))))
+	return request
+}
+
+func TestHandlerAuthenticatesAndReturnsPerItemResults(t *testing.T) {
+	secret := bytes.Repeat([]byte{3}, 32)
+	repository := &recordingRepository{results: []Result{{EventID: "audit_00000000000000000000000000000001", Status: "accepted"}}}
+	handler, err := NewHandler(repository, map[string][]byte{"sense-a": secret})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 11, 0, 1, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	handler.now = func() time.Time { return now }
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(response, signedRequest(t, validBody(t), secret, now, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"))
+	if response.Code != http.StatusOK || len(repository.candidates) != 1 || repository.candidates[0].ErrorCode != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("valid batch rejected: status=%d candidates=%+v", response.Code, repository.candidates)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandlerRejectsStaleOrTamperedRequests(t *testing.T) {
+	secret := bytes.Repeat([]byte{4}, 32)
+	repository := &recordingRepository{}
+	handler, _ := NewHandler(repository, map[string][]byte{"sense-a": secret})
+	now := time.Date(2026, 8, 11, 0, 10, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	handler.now = func() time.Time { return now }
+	for _, request := range []*http.Request{
+		signedRequest(t, validBody(t), secret, now.Add(-301*time.Second), "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"),
+		signedRequest(t, append(validBody(t), ' '), bytes.Repeat([]byte{5}, 32), now, "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"),
+	} {
+		response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+		if response.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+			t.Fatalf("unsafe request returned %d", response.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecodeCandidatesRejectsSensitiveItemWithoutRejectingBatch(t *testing.T) {
+	body := validBody(t)
+	var value map[string]any
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &value)
+	events := value["events"].([]any)
+	event := events[0].(map[string]any)["event"].(map[string]any)
+	event["data"].(map[string]any)["password"] = "must-not-persist"
+	body, _ = json.Marshal(value)
+	candidates, err := decodeCandidates(body)
+	if err != nil || len(candidates) != 1 || candidates[0].ErrorCode != "payload_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected per-item validation: %+v %v", candidates, err)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+)
+
+type keyDocument struct {
+	Version int `json:"version"`
+	Keys    []struct {
+		KeyID  string `json:"key_id"`
+		Secret string `json:"secret_base64url"`
+	} `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+func LoadKeys(path string) (map[string][]byte, error) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read Bell audit key file")
+	}
+	var document keyDocument
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil || document.Version != 1 || len(document.Keys) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid Bell audit key file")
+	}
+	var trailing any
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&trailing); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid Bell audit key file")
+	}
+	values := make(map[string][]byte, len(document.Keys))
+	for _, item := range document.Keys {
+		secret, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(item.Secret)
+		if err != nil || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(item.KeyID) || len(secret) < 32 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid Bell audit key")
+		}
+		if _, exists := values[item.KeyID]; exists {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate Bell audit key ID")
+		}
+		values[item.KeyID] = secret
+	}
+	return values, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"yovision/bell/internal/audit"
+)
+
+func (p *Postgres) AuditRelayReady(ctx context.Context) error {
+	var version int64
+	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(MAX(version), 0) FROM bell.schema_migrations`).Scan(&version); err != nil || version < 4 {
+		return errors.New("postgres Bell schema migration v4 is required for audit relay")
+	}
+	var auditSelect, auditInsert, auditUpdate, auditDelete, auditTruncate bool
+	var receiptUse bool
+	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'SELECT'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'INSERT'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'UPDATE'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'DELETE'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'TRUNCATE'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_relay_receipts', 'SELECT,INSERT,DELETE')`).Scan(
+		&auditSelect, &auditInsert, &auditUpdate, &auditDelete, &auditTruncate, &receiptUse,
+	); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("verify Bell audit relay privileges")
+	}
+	if !auditSelect || !auditInsert || auditUpdate || auditDelete || auditTruncate || !receiptUse {
+		return errors.New("Bell audit relay privileges violate append-only boundary")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p *Postgres) ProcessAuditBatch(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	keyID, nonce string,
+	requestHash [sha256.Size]byte,
+	candidates []audit.Candidate,
+) ([]audit.Result, error) {
+	if len(candidates) < 1 || len(candidates) > audit.MaxBatchSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid audit candidate batch")
+	}
+	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("begin Bell audit batch")
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext($1), hashtext($2))`, keyID, nonce); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("lock Bell audit receipt")
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM bell.audit_relay_receipts WHERE expires_at <= clock_timestamp()`); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("expire Bell audit receipts")
+	}
+	var existingHash, existingBody []byte
+	err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT request_hash, response_body::text
+		FROM bell.audit_relay_receipts WHERE key_id=$1 AND nonce=$2`, keyID, nonce).Scan(&existingHash, &existingBody)
+	if err == nil {
+		if !bytes.Equal(existingHash, requestHash[:]) {
+			return nil, audit.ErrReplayConflict
+		}
+		var response audit.BatchResponse
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(existingBody, &response); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("decode stored Bell audit receipt")
+		}
+		if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("commit Bell audit replay")
+		}
+		return response.Results, nil
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return nil, errors.New("read Bell audit receipt")
+	}
+	results := make([]audit.Result, 0, len(candidates))
+	for _, candidate := range candidates {
+		if candidate.ErrorCode != "" {
+			code := candidate.ErrorCode
+			results = append(results, audit.Result{EventID: candidate.Envelope.Event.EventID, Status: "rejected", ErrorCode: &code})
+			continue
+		}
+		event := candidate.Envelope.Event
+		payload, err := json.Marshal(event)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("encode Bell audit fact")
+		}
+		result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO bell.audit_events(
+			source_system, event_id, schema_version, event_type, tenant_id, site_id,
+			device_id, actor_type, actor_id, reason, trace_id, aggregate_generation,
+			quota_source_version, area_policy_source_version, payload, occurred_at, record_hash
+		) VALUES ('sense',$1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11,$12,$13,$14::jsonb,$15,$16)
+		ON CONFLICT (source_system,event_id) DO NOTHING`,
+			event.EventID, candidate.Envelope.SchemaVersion, event.EventType, event.TenantID,
+			event.SiteID, event.DeviceID, event.Actor.Type, event.Actor.ID, event.Reason,
+			event.TraceID, event.AggregateGeneration,
+			event.ProjectionVersions.QuotaSourceVersion,
+			event.ProjectionVersions.AreaPolicySourceVersion,
+			payload, event.OccurredAt, candidate.RecordHash[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("insert Bell audit fact: %w", err)
+		}
+		affected, err := result.RowsAffected()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("read Bell audit insert result")
+		}
+		if affected == 1 {
+			results = append(results, audit.Result{EventID: event.EventID, Status: "accepted"})
+			continue
+		}
+		var storedHash []byte
+		if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT record_hash FROM bell.audit_events
+			WHERE source_system='sense' AND event_id=$1`, event.EventID).Scan(&storedHash); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("read existing Bell audit fact")
+		}
+		if bytes.Equal(storedHash, candidate.RecordHash[:]) {
+			results = append(results, audit.Result{EventID: event.EventID, Status: "duplicate"})
+		} else {
+			code := "id_conflict"
+			results = append(results, audit.Result{EventID: event.EventID, Status: "rejected", ErrorCode: &code})
+		}
+	}
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(audit.BatchResponse{Results: results})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("encode Bell audit response")
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO bell.audit_relay_receipts(
+		key_id, nonce, request_hash, response_status, response_body, expires_at
+	) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,200,$4::jsonb,clock_timestamp() + interval '10 minutes')`, keyID, nonce, requestHash[:], encoded); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("insert Bell audit receipt")
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("commit Bell audit batch")
+	}
+	return results, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
+
+	"yovision/bell/internal/audit"
+)
+
+func auditCandidate(t *testing.T, eventID, actorID string) audit.Candidate {
+	t.Helper()
+	data := json.RawMessage(`{"kind":"device_created","area_id":"area","modality":"video","capabilities":["video_capture"],"desired_state":"enabled"}`)
+	value := audit.Envelope{SchemaVersion: 1, Event: audit.Event{
+		EventID: eventID, EventType: "device.created", TenantID: "tenant", SiteID: "site", DeviceID: "camera-1",
+		Actor: audit.Actor{Type: "system", ID: actorID}, AggregateGeneration: 1,
+		ProjectionVersions: audit.ProjectionVersions{}, Data: data, OccurredAt: time.Date(2026, 8, 11, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
+	}}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return audit.Candidate{Envelope: value, RecordHash: sha256.Sum256(raw)}
+}
+
+func TestPostgresAuditBatchReceiptAndImmutableFact(t *testing.T) {
+	dsn := os.Getenv("YOVISION_TEST_BELL_POSTGRES_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		t.Skip("YOVISION_TEST_BELL_POSTGRES_DSN is not set")
+	}
+	db, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer db.Close()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	repository, err := OpenPostgres(ctx, db)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := repository.AuditRelayReady(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	requestHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte("request-one"))
+	eventID := "audit_10000000000000000000000000000001"
+	results, err := repository.ProcessAuditBatch(ctx, "sense-a", "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", requestHash, []audit.Candidate{auditCandidate(t, eventID, "sense")})
+	if err != nil || len(results) != 1 || results[0].Status != "accepted" {
+		t.Fatalf("first batch: %+v %v", results, err)
+	}
+	replayed, err := repository.ProcessAuditBatch(ctx, "sense-a", "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", requestHash, []audit.Candidate{auditCandidate(t, eventID, "ignored-by-receipt")})
+	if err != nil || replayed[0].Status != "accepted" {
+		t.Fatalf("receipt replay: %+v %v", replayed, err)
+	}
+	different := sha256.Sum256([]byte("request-two"))
+	if _, err := repository.ProcessAuditBatch(ctx, "sense-a", "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", different, []audit.Candidate{auditCandidate(t, eventID, "sense")}); !errors.Is(err, audit.ErrReplayConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected replay conflict, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	duplicate, err := repository.ProcessAuditBatch(ctx, "sense-a", "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB", different, []audit.Candidate{auditCandidate(t, eventID, "sense")})
+	if err != nil || duplicate[0].Status != "duplicate" {
+		t.Fatalf("event duplicate: %+v %v", duplicate, err)
+	}
+	conflictHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte("request-three"))
+	conflict, err := repository.ProcessAuditBatch(ctx, "sense-a", "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC", conflictHash, []audit.Candidate{auditCandidate(t, eventID, "other")})
+	if err != nil || conflict[0].Status != "rejected" || conflict[0].ErrorCode == nil || *conflict[0].ErrorCode != "id_conflict" {
+		t.Fatalf("event conflict: %+v %v", conflict, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE bell.audit_events SET actor_id='mutated' WHERE event_id=$1`, eventID); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("runtime updated immutable audit fact")
+	}
+	if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM bell.audit_events WHERE event_id=$1`, eventID); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("runtime deleted immutable audit fact")
+	}
+}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Sense M1/M2 接入骨架

-本目录是 YoVision Sense 的 M1/M2 接入骨架。数据库保存期望态，ONVIF 和 MediaMTX 通过端口隔离；M1 默认使用 SQLite，T-009～T-012 增加 PostgreSQL 双 schema、Area 准入、本地审计 Outbox、Control API v1、多实例调和 fencing 和孤儿受控处置。默认关闭真实 ONVIF 与公共业务路由；T-006 的真实样机结论仅覆盖已批准的精确海康基线，不能据此宣称多品牌兼容。
+本目录是 YoVision Sense 的 M1/M2 接入骨架。数据库保存期望态，ONVIF 和 MediaMTX 通过端口隔离；M1 默认使用 SQLite，T-009～T-016 增加 PostgreSQL 双 schema、Area 准入、本地审计 Outbox、Control API v1、多实例调和 fencing、孤儿受控处置和到 Bell 的审计 relay。默认关闭真实 ONVIF、公共业务路由和 relay；T-006 的真实样机结论仅覆盖已批准的精确海康基线，不能据此宣称多品牌兼容。

 ## 常用命令

@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ Unix 将构建产物改为 `bin/sense-api`。服务默认监听 `127.0.0.1:8080`
 | `SENSE_CONTROL_AUTH_FILE` | 空 | 仓库外绝对路径；version 1 JSON 只保存 token SHA-256、主体、tenant、Site scope 和权限 |
 | `SENSE_CONTROL_CURSOR_KEY_FILE` | 空 | 仓库外绝对路径；内容为至少 32 字节随机值的无填充 base64url |
 | `SENSE_CONTROL_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP` | `false` | Control API 非回环明文监听的独立风险接受；正常部署应保持回环并在受控代理终止 TLS |
+| `SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_ENABLED` | `false` | 显式开启 PostgreSQL Outbox → Bell relay；SQLite 不支持 |
+| `SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_URL` | 空 | 精确指向 Bell `/internal/v1/audit-events:batch`；非回环必须 HTTPS |
+| `SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_FILE` | 空 | 仓库外绝对路径 version 1 JSON key 文件，secret 至少 32 字节 |
+| `SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_ID` | 空 | 本实例用于签名的 key ID |
+| `SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_INTERVAL` | `1s` | 队列轮询间隔，最短 1 秒 |

 设备台账只保存 `env://<key>` 凭据引用。真实适配器从进程环境读取以下变量，不把秘密写入 SQLite、日志或 MediaMTX 错误：

@@ -60,7 +65,7 @@ MediaMTX `v1.19.3` 应作为独立二进制启动并只在可信网络开放 API

 初始化与增量 SQL 位于 `deploy/postgres/`，由高权限部署步骤按文件名前缀执行；Sense 进程不会自动创建角色、schema 或 Bell 对象。`bell_app` 拥有 Site/Area、配额、`capture_policy` 及两个版本化视图，`sense_app` 只能读取两个视图，不能读取或写入 Bell 源表。T-011 的 v4 schema 增加资源版本、24 小时幂等收据和 batch operation；T-012 的 v5 schema 增加数据库时钟租约、Path 历史归属及脱敏孤儿报告/处置结果。表中不保存 MediaMTX source URI。应用登录角色和密码由部署环境创建，不进入仓库。

-PostgreSQL 新建设备必须携带匹配 tenant/Site 的 `area_id`。具有 `video_capture` 能力的设备在创建、移动 Area 和从 disabled 切到 enabled 时执行 Area 准入；`non_imaging_only` 拒绝成像设备但允许非成像设备。投影缺失、非法或版本回退只拒绝新变更，不关闭已有流。创建、配置修改和期望态受理都与对应脱敏 Outbox 事实同事务；停用后调和器只删除该设备的精确 MediaMTX path 并收敛为 offline，不枚举未知 path。Bell relay 尚未实现。
+PostgreSQL 新建设备必须携带匹配 tenant/Site 的 `area_id`。具有 `video_capture` 能力的设备在创建、移动 Area 和从 disabled 切到 enabled 时执行 Area 准入；`non_imaging_only` 拒绝成像设备但允许非成像设备。投影缺失、非法或版本回退只拒绝新变更，不关闭已有流。创建、配置修改和期望态受理都与对应脱敏 Outbox 事实同事务；停用后调和器只删除该设备的精确 MediaMTX path 并收敛为 offline，不枚举未知 path。开启 relay 后，Sense 用数据库 lease/fencing 批量投递，成功、重试和 dead letter 均保留本地事实；Sense 不访问 Bell schema。

 Windows 本机集成测试从仓库根目录执行：

@@ -78,7 +83,7 @@ $env:SENSE_DB_DSN = '由部署环境私下设置'
 go run ./cmd/sense-api
 ```

-PostgreSQL 启动会检查 Sense v5 migration、当前角色对两个 Bell 投影视图和本地控制/对账表的最小权限；权限过宽、视图不可读或 schema 未安装时初始化失败。默认 SQLite 路径和 `cmd/sense-lab` 保持不变，但 SQLite 不实现生产 Area/Outbox、多实例租约或孤儿处置语义，Control API 与孤儿扫描在 SQLite 下不会启动。
+PostgreSQL 基础启动会检查 Sense v5 migration、当前角色对两个 Bell 投影视图和本地控制/对账表的最小权限；启用 relay 时额外要求 v6 和本地 Outbox 权限，并确认当前 Sense 登录不能访问 Bell 全局审计表。默认 SQLite 路径和 `cmd/sense-lab` 保持不变，但 SQLite 不实现生产 Area/Outbox、多实例租约、孤儿处置或 relay 语义，Control API、孤儿扫描与 relay 在 SQLite 下不会启动。

 ### 孤儿报告与受控处置

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"syscall"
 	"time"

+	"yovision/sense/internal/auditrelay"
 	"yovision/sense/internal/auth"
 	"yovision/sense/internal/config"
 	"yovision/sense/internal/controlapi"
@@ -55,6 +56,28 @@ func run(logger *slog.Logger) error {
 		return err
 	}
 	defer repository.Close()
+	var auditWorker *auditrelay.Worker
+	if cfg.AuditRelayEnabled {
+		relayStore, ok := repository.(auditrelay.Repository)
+		if !ok {
+			return errors.New("selected repository does not support audit relay")
+		}
+		if err := relayStore.AuditRelayReady(ctx); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		secret, err := auditrelay.LoadKey(cfg.AuditRelayKeyFile, cfg.AuditRelayKeyID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		client, err := auditrelay.NewClient(cfg.AuditRelayURL, cfg.AuditRelayKeyID, secret, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		auditWorker, err = auditrelay.NewWorker(relayStore, client, instanceID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
 	var controlHandler http.Handler
 	if cfg.ControlAPIEnabled {
 		controlStore, ok := repository.(store.ControlRepository)
@@ -116,6 +139,9 @@ func run(logger *slog.Logger) error {
 	if orphanScanner != nil {
 		startBackground(func() { orphanScanner.Run(ctx, cfg.OrphanScanInterval, report) })
 	}
+	if auditWorker != nil {
+		startBackground(func() { auditWorker.Run(ctx, cfg.AuditRelayInterval, report) })
+	}

 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(writer http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -146,7 +172,8 @@ func run(logger *slog.Logger) error {
 	go func() {
 		logger.Info("Sense listening", "address", cfg.HTTPAddress, "version", version,
 			"instance_id", instanceID,
-			"control_api_enabled", cfg.ControlAPIEnabled)
+			"control_api_enabled", cfg.ControlAPIEnabled,
+			"audit_relay_enabled", cfg.AuditRelayEnabled)
 		serverErrors <- server.ListenAndServe()
 	}()

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+package auditrelay
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func testEnvelope(id string) Envelope {
+	return Envelope{SchemaVersion: 1, Event: Event{
+		EventID: id, EventType: "device.created", TenantID: "tenant", SiteID: "site", DeviceID: "camera-1",
+		Actor: Actor{Type: "system", ID: "sense"}, AggregateGeneration: 1,
+		ProjectionVersions: ProjectionVersions{}, Data: json.RawMessage(`{"kind":"device_created"}`), OccurredAt: time.Unix(1, 0).UTC(),
+	}}
+}
+
+func TestClientSignsCanonicalRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	secret := bytesOf(32, 7)
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+		body := make([]byte, request.ContentLength)
+		_, _ = request.Body.Read(body)
+		canonical := CanonicalString(request.Method, request.URL.Path, request.Header.Get(HeaderTimestamp), request.Header.Get(HeaderNonce), body)
+		if request.Header.Get(HeaderSignature) != Signature(secret, canonical) {
+			t.Error("request signature did not match canonical vector")
+		}
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(writer).Encode(BatchResponse{Results: []Result{{EventID: "audit_00000000000000000000000000000001", Status: "accepted"}}})
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+	client, err := NewClient(server.URL+RelayPath, "sense-a", secret, server.Client())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	client.now = func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1_800_000_000, 0) }
+	client.nonce = func() (string, error) { return "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", nil }
+	results, err := client.Send(context.Background(), []Envelope{testEnvelope("audit_00000000000000000000000000000001")})
+	if err != nil || len(results) != 1 || results[0].Status != "accepted" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected relay result: %+v, %v", results, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEndpointAndKeySecurity(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := ValidateEndpoint("http://example.com" + RelayPath); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("remote plaintext relay URL was accepted")
+	}
+	if _, err := ValidateEndpoint("https://example.com" + RelayPath + "?secret=x"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("relay URL query was accepted")
+	}
+	secret := bytesOf(32, 9)
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "keys.json")
+	document := map[string]any{"version": 1, "keys": []any{map[string]any{"key_id": "sense-a", "secret_base64url": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(secret)}}}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(document)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	loaded, err := LoadKey(path, "sense-a")
+	if err != nil || sha256.Sum256(loaded) != sha256.Sum256(secret) {
+		t.Fatalf("external key was not loaded: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+type fakeRepository struct {
+	queued    []QueuedEvent
+	completed []Completion
+}
+
+func (*fakeRepository) AuditRelayReady(context.Context) error { return nil }
+func (f *fakeRepository) ClaimAuditRelayBatch(context.Context, string, int, time.Duration) ([]QueuedEvent, error) {
+	return f.queued, nil
+}
+func (f *fakeRepository) CompleteAuditRelayBatch(_ context.Context, _ string, values []Completion) error {
+	f.completed = append([]Completion(nil), values...)
+	return nil
+}
+
+type fakeSender struct {
+	results []Result
+	err     error
+}
+
+func (f fakeSender) Send(context.Context, []Envelope) ([]Result, error) { return f.results, f.err }
+
+func TestWorkerDispositionAndBackoff(t *testing.T) {
+	first := "audit_00000000000000000000000000000001"
+	second := "audit_00000000000000000000000000000002"
+	repository := &fakeRepository{queued: []QueuedEvent{{Envelope: testEnvelope(first), LeaseToken: 1, AttemptCount: 1}, {Envelope: testEnvelope(second), LeaseToken: 2, AttemptCount: 10}}}
+	code := "schema_invalid"
+	worker, _ := NewWorker(repository, fakeSender{results: []Result{{EventID: first, Status: "accepted"}, {EventID: second, Status: "rejected", ErrorCode: &code}}}, "worker")
+	if err := worker.RelayOnce(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if repository.completed[0].Disposition != Delivered || repository.completed[1].Disposition != DeadLetter {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected dispositions: %+v", repository.completed)
+	}
+
+	repository.completed = nil
+	worker.sender = fakeSender{err: errors.New("network")}
+	if err := worker.RelayOnce(context.Background()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("network failure was hidden")
+	}
+	if repository.completed[0].RetryAfter != time.Second || repository.completed[1].RetryAfter != 300*time.Second {
+		t.Fatalf("retry bounds drifted: %+v", repository.completed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWorkerRetriesWholeBatchForIncompleteResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	first := "audit_00000000000000000000000000000001"
+	second := "audit_00000000000000000000000000000002"
+	repository := &fakeRepository{queued: []QueuedEvent{{Envelope: testEnvelope(first), LeaseToken: 1, AttemptCount: 1}, {Envelope: testEnvelope(second), LeaseToken: 2, AttemptCount: 2}}}
+	worker, _ := NewWorker(repository, fakeSender{results: []Result{{EventID: first, Status: "accepted"}}}, "worker")
+	if err := worker.RelayOnce(context.Background()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("incomplete response was accepted")
+	}
+	if len(repository.completed) != 2 || repository.completed[0].Disposition != Retry || repository.completed[1].Disposition != Retry {
+		t.Fatalf("incomplete response partially completed the batch: %+v", repository.completed)
+	}
+}
+
+func bytesOf(size int, value byte) []byte {
+	result := make([]byte, size)
+	for index := range result {
+		result[index] = value
+	}
+	return result
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+package auditrelay
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	HeaderKeyID     = "X-YoVision-Key-Id"
+	HeaderTimestamp = "X-YoVision-Timestamp"
+	HeaderNonce     = "X-YoVision-Nonce"
+	HeaderSignature = "X-YoVision-Signature"
+	RelayPath       = "/internal/v1/audit-events:batch"
+)
+
+type Client struct {
+	endpoint   *url.URL
+	keyID      string
+	secret     []byte
+	httpClient *http.Client
+	now        func() time.Time
+	nonce      func() (string, error)
+}
+
+func NewClient(rawURL, keyID string, secret []byte, client *http.Client) (*Client, error) {
+	endpoint, err := ValidateEndpoint(rawURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if keyID == "" || len(secret) < 32 {
+		return nil, errors.New("audit relay key ID and 32-byte secret are required")
+	}
+	if client == nil {
+		client = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
+	}
+	return &Client{endpoint: endpoint, keyID: keyID, secret: append([]byte(nil), secret...), httpClient: client, now: time.Now, nonce: randomNonce}, nil
+}
+
+func ValidateEndpoint(rawURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
+	if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" || parsed.Path != RelayPath || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.User != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid Bell audit relay URL")
+	}
+	host := parsed.Hostname()
+	ip := net.ParseIP(host)
+	loopback := strings.EqualFold(host, "localhost") || (ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback())
+	if parsed.Scheme != "https" && !(parsed.Scheme == "http" && loopback) {
+		return nil, errors.New("Bell audit relay URL requires HTTPS outside loopback")
+	}
+	return parsed, nil
+}
+
+func CanonicalString(method, path, timestamp, nonce string, body []byte) string {
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	return strings.Join([]string{method, path, timestamp, nonce, hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])}, "\n")
+}
+
+func Signature(secret []byte, canonical string) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
+	_, _ = mac.Write([]byte(canonical))
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func randomNonce() (string, error) {
+	value := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(value); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(value), nil
+}
+
+func (c *Client) Send(ctx context.Context, events []Envelope) ([]Result, error) {
+	if len(events) < 1 || len(events) > MaxBatchSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("audit relay batch must contain 1 to 100 events")
+	}
+	body, err := json.Marshal(BatchRequest{Events: events})
+	if err != nil || len(body) > MaxBodyBytes {
+		return nil, errors.New("encode audit relay batch")
+	}
+	requestContext, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	timestamp := strconv.FormatInt(c.now().UTC().Unix(), 10)
+	nonce, err := c.nonce()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("generate audit relay nonce")
+	}
+	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(requestContext, http.MethodPost, c.endpoint.String(), bytes.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("create audit relay request")
+	}
+	request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderKeyID, c.keyID)
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderTimestamp, timestamp)
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderNonce, nonce)
+	request.Header.Set(HeaderSignature, Signature(c.secret, CanonicalString(http.MethodPost, RelayPath, timestamp, nonce, body)))
+	response, err := c.httpClient.Do(request)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("send audit relay request")
+	}
+	defer response.Body.Close()
+	if response.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(response.Body, 4096))
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Bell audit relay returned HTTP %d", response.StatusCode)
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(response.Body, MaxBodyBytes+1))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	var decoded BatchResponse
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&decoded); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("decode audit relay response")
+	}
+	var trailing any
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&trailing); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("audit relay response contains trailing data")
+	}
+	return decoded.Results, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+package auditrelay
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"regexp"
+)
+
+var keyIDPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$`)
+
+type keyFile struct {
+	Version int `json:"version"`
+	Keys    []struct {
+		KeyID  string `json:"key_id"`
+		Secret string `json:"secret_base64url"`
+	} `json:"keys"`
+}
+
+func LoadKey(path, keyID string) ([]byte, error) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("read audit relay key file")
+	}
+	var document keyFile
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&document); err != nil || document.Version != 1 || len(document.Keys) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid audit relay key file")
+	}
+	var trailing any
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&trailing); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid audit relay key file")
+	}
+	values := make(map[string][]byte, len(document.Keys))
+	for _, candidate := range document.Keys {
+		secret, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(candidate.Secret)
+		if err != nil || !keyIDPattern.MatchString(candidate.KeyID) || len(secret) < 32 {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid audit relay secret")
+		}
+		if _, duplicate := values[candidate.KeyID]; duplicate {
+			return nil, errors.New("duplicate audit relay key ID")
+		}
+		values[candidate.KeyID] = secret
+	}
+	if secret, exists := values[keyID]; exists {
+		return secret, nil
+	}
+	return nil, errors.New("audit relay key ID not found")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Package auditrelay delivers Sense-owned audit facts to Bell without sharing databases.
+package auditrelay
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	MaxBatchSize  = 100
+	MaxBodyBytes  = 1 << 20
+	LeaseDuration = 30 * time.Second
+)
+
+type Actor struct {
+	Type string `json:"type"`
+	ID   string `json:"id"`
+}
+
+type ProjectionVersions struct {
+	QuotaSourceVersion      *int64 `json:"quota_source_version"`
+	AreaPolicySourceVersion *int64 `json:"area_policy_source_version"`
+}
+
+type Event struct {
+	EventID             string             `json:"event_id"`
+	EventType           string             `json:"event_type"`
+	TenantID            string             `json:"tenant_id"`
+	SiteID              string             `json:"site_id"`
+	DeviceID            string             `json:"device_id"`
+	Actor               Actor              `json:"actor"`
+	Reason              *string            `json:"reason"`
+	TraceID             *string            `json:"trace_id"`
+	AggregateGeneration int64              `json:"aggregate_generation"`
+	ProjectionVersions  ProjectionVersions `json:"projection_versions"`
+	Data                json.RawMessage    `json:"data"`
+	OccurredAt          time.Time          `json:"occurred_at"`
+}
+
+type Envelope struct {
+	SchemaVersion int   `json:"schema_version"`
+	Event         Event `json:"event"`
+}
+
+type BatchRequest struct {
+	Events []Envelope `json:"events"`
+}
+
+type Result struct {
+	EventID   string  `json:"event_id"`
+	Status    string  `json:"status"`
+	ErrorCode *string `json:"error_code,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type BatchResponse struct {
+	Results []Result `json:"results"`
+}
+
+type QueuedEvent struct {
+	Envelope
+	LeaseToken   int64
+	AttemptCount int
+}
+
+type Disposition string
+
+const (
+	Delivered  Disposition = "delivered"
+	DeadLetter Disposition = "dead_letter"
+	Retry      Disposition = "retry"
+)
+
+type Completion struct {
+	EventID     string
+	LeaseToken  int64
+	Disposition Disposition
+	ErrorCode   string
+	RetryAfter  time.Duration
+}
+
+var ErrLeaseLost = errors.New("audit relay lease lost")
+
+type Repository interface {
+	AuditRelayReady(context.Context) error
+	ClaimAuditRelayBatch(context.Context, string, int, time.Duration) ([]QueuedEvent, error)
+	CompleteAuditRelayBatch(context.Context, string, []Completion) error
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package auditrelay
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"regexp"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var stableErrorCode = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{0,63}$`)
+
+type Sender interface {
+	Send(context.Context, []Envelope) ([]Result, error)
+}
+
+type Worker struct {
+	repository Repository
+	sender     Sender
+	owner      string
+}
+
+func NewWorker(repository Repository, sender Sender, owner string) (*Worker, error) {
+	if repository == nil || sender == nil || owner == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("audit relay worker dependencies are required")
+	}
+	return &Worker{repository: repository, sender: sender, owner: owner}, nil
+}
+
+func RetryDelay(attempt int) time.Duration {
+	if attempt < 1 {
+		attempt = 1
+	}
+	if attempt > 9 {
+		return 300 * time.Second
+	}
+	delay := time.Second << (attempt - 1)
+	if delay > 300*time.Second {
+		return 300 * time.Second
+	}
+	return delay
+}
+
+func (w *Worker) RelayOnce(ctx context.Context) error {
+	queued, err := w.repository.ClaimAuditRelayBatch(ctx, w.owner, MaxBatchSize, LeaseDuration)
+	if err != nil || len(queued) == 0 {
+		return err
+	}
+	events := make([]Envelope, len(queued))
+	for index := range queued {
+		events[index] = queued[index].Envelope
+	}
+	results, sendErr := w.sender.Send(ctx, events)
+	if sendErr != nil {
+		completions := make([]Completion, len(queued))
+		for index, value := range queued {
+			completions[index] = Completion{EventID: value.Event.EventID, LeaseToken: value.LeaseToken, Disposition: Retry, ErrorCode: "delivery_failed", RetryAfter: RetryDelay(value.AttemptCount)}
+		}
+		if err := w.repository.CompleteAuditRelayBatch(ctx, w.owner, completions); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return sendErr
+	}
+	if len(results) != len(queued) {
+		return w.retryAll(ctx, queued, "invalid_response")
+	}
+	expected := make(map[string]bool, len(queued))
+	for _, value := range queued {
+		expected[value.Event.EventID] = true
+	}
+	byID := make(map[string]Result, len(results))
+	for _, result := range results {
+		validStatus := ((result.Status == "accepted" || result.Status == "duplicate") && result.ErrorCode == nil) ||
+			(result.Status == "rejected" && result.ErrorCode != nil && stableErrorCode.MatchString(*result.ErrorCode))
+		if !expected[result.EventID] || !validStatus {
+			return w.retryAll(ctx, queued, "invalid_response")
+		}
+		if _, duplicate := byID[result.EventID]; duplicate {
+			return w.retryAll(ctx, queued, "invalid_response")
+		}
+		byID[result.EventID] = result
+	}
+	completions := make([]Completion, 0, len(queued))
+	for _, value := range queued {
+		result, ok := byID[value.Event.EventID]
+		if !ok {
+			return w.retryAll(ctx, queued, "invalid_response")
+		}
+		switch result.Status {
+		case "accepted", "duplicate":
+			completions = append(completions, Completion{EventID: value.Event.EventID, LeaseToken: value.LeaseToken, Disposition: Delivered})
+		case "rejected":
+			completions = append(completions, Completion{EventID: value.Event.EventID, LeaseToken: value.LeaseToken, Disposition: DeadLetter, ErrorCode: *result.ErrorCode})
+		}
+	}
+	return w.repository.CompleteAuditRelayBatch(ctx, w.owner, completions)
+}
+
+func (w *Worker) retryAll(ctx context.Context, queued []QueuedEvent, code string) error {
+	values := make([]Completion, len(queued))
+	for index, value := range queued {
+		values[index] = Completion{EventID: value.Event.EventID, LeaseToken: value.LeaseToken, Disposition: Retry, ErrorCode: code, RetryAfter: RetryDelay(value.AttemptCount)}
+	}
+	if err := w.repository.CompleteAuditRelayBatch(ctx, w.owner, values); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("audit relay %s", code)
+}
+
+func (w *Worker) Run(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration, report func(error)) {
+	if interval <= 0 {
+		interval = time.Second
+	}
+	for {
+		if err := w.RelayOnce(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil && report != nil {
+			report(err)
+		}
+		timer := time.NewTimer(interval)
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			timer.Stop()
+			return
+		case <-timer.C:
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ const (
 	defaultOrphanScanPeriod = time.Minute
 	defaultONVIFMode        = "disabled"
 	defaultControlAuthMode  = "static-sha256"
+	defaultAuditRelayPeriod = time.Second
 )

 var instanceIDPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$`)
@@ -53,6 +54,11 @@ type Config struct {
 	ControlAuthFile           string
 	ControlCursorKeyFile      string
 	ControlAllowInsecureHTTP  bool
+	AuditRelayEnabled         bool
+	AuditRelayURL             string
+	AuditRelayKeyFile         string
+	AuditRelayKeyID           string
+	AuditRelayInterval        time.Duration
 }

 func Load() (Config, error) {
@@ -92,6 +98,14 @@ func Load() (Config, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return Config{}, err
 	}
+	auditRelayEnabled, err := boolEnv("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_ENABLED", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Config{}, err
+	}
+	auditRelayInterval, err := durationEnv("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_INTERVAL", defaultAuditRelayPeriod)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Config{}, err
+	}
 	metricsEnabled, err := boolEnv("SENSE_METRICS_ENABLED", true)
 	if err != nil {
 		return Config{}, err
@@ -130,6 +144,11 @@ func Load() (Config, error) {
 		ControlAuthFile:           stringEnv("SENSE_CONTROL_AUTH_FILE", ""),
 		ControlCursorKeyFile:      stringEnv("SENSE_CONTROL_CURSOR_KEY_FILE", ""),
 		ControlAllowInsecureHTTP:  controlAllowInsecure,
+		AuditRelayEnabled:         auditRelayEnabled,
+		AuditRelayURL:             stringEnv("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_URL", ""),
+		AuditRelayKeyFile:         stringEnv("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_FILE", ""),
+		AuditRelayKeyID:           stringEnv("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_ID", ""),
+		AuditRelayInterval:        auditRelayInterval,
 	}
 	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
 		return Config{}, err
@@ -228,6 +247,31 @@ func (c Config) Validate() error {
 			return fmt.Errorf("non-loopback Control API requires SENSE_CONTROL_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true")
 		}
 	}
+	if c.AuditRelayEnabled {
+		if databaseDriver != postgresDatabaseDriver {
+			return fmt.Errorf("Sense audit relay requires SENSE_DB_DRIVER=postgres")
+		}
+		if c.AuditRelayKeyFile == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(c.AuditRelayKeyFile) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_FILE must be an absolute external path")
+		}
+		if !instanceIDPattern.MatchString(c.AuditRelayKeyID) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_ID")
+		}
+		if c.AuditRelayInterval < time.Second {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_INTERVAL must be at least 1s")
+		}
+		relayURL, err := url.Parse(c.AuditRelayURL)
+		if err != nil || relayURL.Host == "" || relayURL.Path != "/internal/v1/audit-events:batch" ||
+			relayURL.RawQuery != "" || relayURL.Fragment != "" || relayURL.User != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_URL")
+		}
+		relayHost := relayURL.Hostname()
+		relayIP := net.ParseIP(relayHost)
+		relayLoopback := relayHost == "localhost" || (relayIP != nil && relayIP.IsLoopback())
+		if relayURL.Scheme != "https" && !(relayURL.Scheme == "http" && relayLoopback) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_URL requires HTTPS outside loopback")
+		}
+	}
 	return nil
 }

@@ -166,3 +166,31 @@ func TestValidateControlAPINonLoopbackNeedsSeparateRiskAcceptance(t *testing.T)
 		t.Fatalf("explicit non-loopback Control API risk acceptance failed: %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestValidateAuditRelaySecurityBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	base := Config{
+		HTTPAddress: "127.0.0.1:8080", DatabaseDriver: "postgres",
+		DatabaseDSN: "postgres://sense-runtime@127.0.0.1/yovision?sslmode=disable",
+		MediaMTXURL: "http://127.0.0.1:9997", ReconcileInterval: time.Second, ProbeInterval: time.Second,
+		AuditRelayEnabled: true, AuditRelayURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8081/internal/v1/audit-events:batch",
+		AuditRelayKeyFile: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "relay-keys.json"), AuditRelayKeyID: "sense-a", AuditRelayInterval: time.Second,
+	}
+	if err := base.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid loopback relay rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	remoteHTTP := base
+	remoteHTTP.AuditRelayURL = "http://bell.example/internal/v1/audit-events:batch"
+	if err := remoteHTTP.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("remote plaintext relay was accepted")
+	}
+	sqlite := base
+	sqlite.DatabaseDriver, sqlite.DatabaseDSN = "sqlite", "file:test.db"
+	if err := sqlite.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("SQLite audit relay was accepted")
+	}
+	relativeKey := base
+	relativeKey.AuditRelayKeyFile = "relay-keys.json"
+	if err := relativeKey.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("repository-relative relay key was accepted")
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"yovision/sense/internal/auditrelay"
+)
+
+var relayErrorCode = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{0,63}$`)
+
+func (s *Postgres) AuditRelayReady(ctx context.Context) error {
+	var version int64
+	if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(MAX(version), 0) FROM sense.schema_migrations`).Scan(&version); err != nil || version < 6 {
+		return errors.New("postgres Sense schema migration v6 is required for audit relay")
+	}
+	var canUseOutbox, canReadBell, canWriteBell bool
+	if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'sense.device_operation_outbox', 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'SELECT'),
+		has_table_privilege(current_user, 'bell.audit_events', 'INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE')`).Scan(
+		&canUseOutbox, &canReadBell, &canWriteBell,
+	); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("verify audit relay privileges")
+	}
+	if !canUseOutbox || canReadBell || canWriteBell {
+		return errors.New("Sense audit relay violates schema ownership boundary")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *Postgres) ClaimAuditRelayBatch(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	owner string,
+	limit int,
+	lease time.Duration,
+) ([]auditrelay.QueuedEvent, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(owner) == "" || limit < 1 || limit > auditrelay.MaxBatchSize || lease <= 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid audit relay claim")
+	}
+	rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, `WITH due AS (
+		SELECT event_id FROM sense.device_operation_outbox
+		WHERE delivered_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL
+			AND COALESCE(next_attempt_at, available_at) <= clock_timestamp()
+			AND (relay_lease_until IS NULL OR relay_lease_until <= clock_timestamp())
+		ORDER BY COALESCE(next_attempt_at, available_at), event_id
+		FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED LIMIT $1
+	)
+	UPDATE sense.device_operation_outbox AS outbox SET
+		relay_lease_owner = $2,
+		relay_lease_token = outbox.relay_lease_token + 1,
+		relay_lease_until = clock_timestamp() + ($3 * interval '1 second'),
+		attempt_count = outbox.attempt_count + 1,
+		last_error_code = NULL
+	FROM due WHERE outbox.event_id = due.event_id
+	RETURNING outbox.event_id, outbox.event_type, outbox.tenant_id,
+		outbox.site_id, outbox.device_id, outbox.actor_type, outbox.actor_id,
+		outbox.reason, outbox.trace_id, outbox.aggregate_generation,
+		outbox.quota_source_version, outbox.area_policy_source_version,
+		outbox.payload, outbox.occurred_at, outbox.relay_lease_token,
+		outbox.attempt_count`, limit, owner, lease.Seconds())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("claim audit relay batch")
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	values := make([]auditrelay.QueuedEvent, 0)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var value auditrelay.QueuedEvent
+		var reason, trace sql.NullString
+		var quota, area sql.NullInt64
+		var payload []byte
+		if err := rows.Scan(
+			&value.Event.EventID, &value.Event.EventType, &value.Event.TenantID,
+			&value.Event.SiteID, &value.Event.DeviceID, &value.Event.Actor.Type,
+			&value.Event.Actor.ID, &reason, &trace, &value.Event.AggregateGeneration,
+			&quota, &area, &payload, &value.Event.OccurredAt, &value.LeaseToken,
+			&value.AttemptCount,
+		); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("scan audit relay claim")
+		}
+		if reason.Valid {
+			value.Event.Reason = &reason.String
+		}
+		if trace.Valid {
+			value.Event.TraceID = &trace.String
+		}
+		if quota.Valid {
+			value.Event.ProjectionVersions.QuotaSourceVersion = &quota.Int64
+		}
+		if area.Valid {
+			value.Event.ProjectionVersions.AreaPolicySourceVersion = &area.Int64
+		}
+		if !json.Valid(payload) {
+			return nil, errors.New("invalid audit payload in outbox")
+		}
+		value.Event.Data = append(json.RawMessage(nil), payload...)
+		value.SchemaVersion = 1
+		if value.Event.EventType == "device.configuration.accepted" {
+			value.SchemaVersion = 2
+		}
+		values = append(values, value)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("iterate audit relay claims")
+	}
+	return values, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Postgres) CompleteAuditRelayBatch(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	owner string,
+	values []auditrelay.Completion,
+) error {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(owner) == "" || len(values) == 0 || len(values) > auditrelay.MaxBatchSize {
+		return errors.New("invalid audit relay completion")
+	}
+	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.New("begin audit relay completion")
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+	for _, value := range values {
+		code := value.ErrorCode
+		if code != "" && !relayErrorCode.MatchString(code) {
+			code = "invalid_response"
+		}
+		var result sql.Result
+		switch value.Disposition {
+		case auditrelay.Delivered:
+			result, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sense.device_operation_outbox SET
+				delivered_at = clock_timestamp(), last_error_code = NULL,
+				relay_lease_owner = NULL, relay_lease_until = NULL
+			WHERE event_id = $1 AND relay_lease_owner = $2 AND relay_lease_token = $3
+				AND relay_lease_until > clock_timestamp()`, value.EventID, owner, value.LeaseToken)
+		case auditrelay.DeadLetter:
+			if code == "" {
+				return errors.New("dead-letter completion requires an error code")
+			}
+			result, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sense.device_operation_outbox SET
+				dead_lettered_at = clock_timestamp(), last_error_code = $4,
+				relay_lease_owner = NULL, relay_lease_until = NULL
+			WHERE event_id = $1 AND relay_lease_owner = $2 AND relay_lease_token = $3
+				AND relay_lease_until > clock_timestamp()`, value.EventID, owner, value.LeaseToken, code)
+		case auditrelay.Retry:
+			if code == "" || value.RetryAfter < time.Second || value.RetryAfter > 300*time.Second {
+				return errors.New("invalid audit relay retry completion")
+			}
+			result, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sense.device_operation_outbox SET
+				next_attempt_at = clock_timestamp() + ($4 * interval '1 second'),
+				last_error_code = $5, relay_lease_owner = NULL, relay_lease_until = NULL
+			WHERE event_id = $1 AND relay_lease_owner = $2 AND relay_lease_token = $3
+				AND relay_lease_until > clock_timestamp()`, value.EventID, owner, value.LeaseToken, value.RetryAfter.Seconds(), code)
+		default:
+			return errors.New("invalid audit relay disposition")
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return errors.New("persist audit relay completion")
+		}
+		affected, err := result.RowsAffected()
+		if err != nil {
+			return errors.New("read audit relay completion")
+		}
+		if affected != 1 {
+			return auditrelay.ErrLeaseLost
+		}
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("commit audit relay completion")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"yovision/sense/internal/auditrelay"
+)
+
+func TestPostgresAuditRelayClaimUsesFencing(t *testing.T) {
+	repository, admin := openPostgresTestStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if err := repository.AuditRelayReady(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	insertBellSite(t, admin, "relay-tenant", "relay-site", 1)
+	device := videoDevice(9001, "relay-tenant", "relay-site")
+	if err := repository.CreateDevice(ctx, device); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	first, err := repository.ClaimAuditRelayBatch(ctx, "worker-a", 100, 30*time.Second)
+	if err != nil || len(first) != 1 || first[0].SchemaVersion != 1 || first[0].AttemptCount != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("first claim: %+v %v", first, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := admin.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE sense.device_operation_outbox SET relay_lease_until=clock_timestamp()-interval '1 second' WHERE event_id=$1`, first[0].Event.EventID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	second, err := repository.ClaimAuditRelayBatch(ctx, "worker-b", 100, 30*time.Second)
+	if err != nil || len(second) != 1 || second[0].LeaseToken <= first[0].LeaseToken {
+		t.Fatalf("reclaim: %+v %v", second, err)
+	}
+	err = repository.CompleteAuditRelayBatch(ctx, "worker-a", []auditrelay.Completion{{EventID: first[0].Event.EventID, LeaseToken: first[0].LeaseToken, Disposition: auditrelay.Delivered}})
+	if !errors.Is(err, auditrelay.ErrLeaseLost) {
+		t.Fatalf("stale worker completion returned %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := repository.CompleteAuditRelayBatch(ctx, "worker-b", []auditrelay.Completion{{EventID: second[0].Event.EventID, LeaseToken: second[0].LeaseToken, Disposition: auditrelay.Delivered}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var delivered bool
+	if err := admin.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT delivered_at IS NOT NULL FROM sense.device_operation_outbox WHERE event_id=$1`, first[0].Event.EventID).Scan(&delivered); err != nil || !delivered {
+		t.Fatalf("delivered=%v err=%v", delivered, err)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+-- Sense Outbox relay fencing and Bell global audit facts.
+
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS relay_lease_owner text,
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS relay_lease_token bigint NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS relay_lease_until timestamptz,
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS last_error_code text,
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS dead_lettered_at timestamptz;
+
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS sense_outbox_relay_lease_pair;
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    ADD CONSTRAINT sense_outbox_relay_lease_pair CHECK (
+        (relay_lease_owner IS NULL AND relay_lease_until IS NULL)
+        OR (relay_lease_owner IS NOT NULL AND btrim(relay_lease_owner) <> ''
+            AND relay_lease_until IS NOT NULL)
+    );
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS sense_outbox_relay_token_nonnegative;
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    ADD CONSTRAINT sense_outbox_relay_token_nonnegative CHECK (relay_lease_token >= 0);
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS sense_outbox_relay_error_length;
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    ADD CONSTRAINT sense_outbox_relay_error_length CHECK (
+        last_error_code IS NULL OR (
+            char_length(last_error_code) BETWEEN 1 AND 64
+            AND last_error_code ~ '^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$'
+        )
+    );
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS sense_outbox_relay_terminal_state;
+ALTER TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox
+    ADD CONSTRAINT sense_outbox_relay_terminal_state CHECK (
+        delivered_at IS NULL OR dead_lettered_at IS NULL
+    );
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS sense_outbox_relay_due_idx
+    ON sense.device_operation_outbox(
+        COALESCE(next_attempt_at, available_at), event_id
+    )
+    WHERE delivered_at IS NULL AND dead_lettered_at IS NULL;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS bell.audit_events (
+    source_system text NOT NULL,
+    event_id text NOT NULL,
+    schema_version smallint NOT NULL,
+    event_type text NOT NULL,
+    tenant_id text NOT NULL,
+    site_id text NOT NULL,
+    device_id text NOT NULL,
+    actor_type text NOT NULL,
+    actor_id text NOT NULL,
+    reason text,
+    trace_id text,
+    aggregate_generation bigint NOT NULL,
+    quota_source_version bigint,
+    area_policy_source_version bigint,
+    payload jsonb NOT NULL,
+    occurred_at timestamptz NOT NULL,
+    received_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT clock_timestamp(),
+    record_hash bytea NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (source_system, event_id),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_source_system CHECK (source_system = 'sense'),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_event_id CHECK (event_id ~ '^audit_[0-9a-f]{32}$'),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_schema_version CHECK (schema_version IN (1, 2)),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_event_type CHECK (event_type IN (
+        'device.created',
+        'device.desired_state.accepted',
+        'device.configuration.accepted'
+    )),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_identity_not_blank CHECK (
+        btrim(tenant_id) <> '' AND btrim(site_id) <> '' AND btrim(device_id) <> ''
+        AND btrim(actor_id) <> ''
+    ),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_actor_type CHECK (actor_type IN ('user', 'service', 'system')),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_generation_positive CHECK (aggregate_generation >= 1),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_projection_versions CHECK (
+        (quota_source_version IS NULL OR quota_source_version >= 1)
+        AND (area_policy_source_version IS NULL OR area_policy_source_version >= 1)
+    ),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_reason_length CHECK (reason IS NULL OR char_length(reason) <= 500),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_trace_length CHECK (trace_id IS NULL OR char_length(trace_id) <= 128),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_payload_object CHECK (jsonb_typeof(payload) = 'object'),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_record_hash_length CHECK (octet_length(record_hash) = 32)
+);
+ALTER TABLE bell.audit_events OWNER TO bell_app;
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS bell_audit_events_immutable ON bell.audit_events;
+CREATE TRIGGER bell_audit_events_immutable
+BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON bell.audit_events
+FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION bell.reject_immutable_change();
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS bell_audit_scope_time_idx
+    ON bell.audit_events(tenant_id, site_id, occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS bell_audit_device_time_idx
+    ON bell.audit_events(tenant_id, site_id, device_id, occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS bell.audit_relay_receipts (
+    key_id text NOT NULL,
+    nonce text NOT NULL,
+    request_hash bytea NOT NULL,
+    response_status integer NOT NULL,
+    response_body jsonb NOT NULL,
+    received_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT clock_timestamp(),
+    expires_at timestamptz NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (key_id, nonce),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_receipt_key_id CHECK (
+        char_length(key_id) BETWEEN 1 AND 64 AND key_id ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$'
+    ),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_receipt_nonce CHECK (
+        char_length(nonce) BETWEEN 22 AND 64 AND nonce ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$'
+    ),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_receipt_hash_length CHECK (octet_length(request_hash) = 32),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_receipt_status CHECK (response_status = 200),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_receipt_body CHECK (jsonb_typeof(response_body) = 'object'),
+    CONSTRAINT bell_audit_receipt_ttl CHECK (
+        expires_at >= received_at + interval '10 minutes'
+        AND expires_at <= received_at + interval '11 minutes'
+    )
+);
+ALTER TABLE bell.audit_relay_receipts OWNER TO bell_app;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS bell_audit_receipt_expiry_idx
+    ON bell.audit_relay_receipts(expires_at, key_id, nonce);
+
+INSERT INTO bell.schema_migrations(version) VALUES (4)
+ON CONFLICT (version) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO sense.schema_migrations(version) VALUES (6)
+ON CONFLICT (version) DO NOTHING;
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-- Bell runtime may append global audit facts and maintain only short-lived
+-- idempotency receipts. Sense keeps ownership of its local Outbox.
+
+REVOKE ALL ON TABLE bell.audit_events, bell.audit_relay_receipts FROM PUBLIC;
+REVOKE ALL ON TABLE bell.audit_events, bell.audit_relay_receipts FROM bell_runtime;
+
+GRANT SELECT, INSERT ON TABLE bell.audit_events TO bell_runtime;
+GRANT SELECT, INSERT, DELETE ON TABLE bell.audit_relay_receipts TO bell_runtime;
+
+REVOKE ALL ON TABLE bell.audit_events, bell.audit_relay_receipts FROM sense_app;
+GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLE sense.device_operation_outbox TO sense_app;
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # YoVision PostgreSQL 初始化

-本目录实现 T-009～T-012、T-015 的 PostgreSQL `17.10` schema。SQL 必须按文件名前缀顺序执行：`001`～`004` 创建 NOLOGIN 权限角色、Bell/Sense 初始对象和配额权限；`005`～`007` 增量增加 Area 与审计；`008`～`009` 增加 Control API 状态；`010`～`011` 增加调和 fencing、MediaMTX Path 历史归属、孤儿报告/受控处置结果；`012`～`013` 增加 Bell 不可变事件、append-only outcome 和独立 `bell_runtime` 最小权限。全部 SQL 可重放。对象 owner/迁移角色为 `bell_app`/`sense_app`；应用登录角色及密码由部署环境或密钥系统创建，Sense 登录加入 `sense_app`，Bell 运行登录只加入 `bell_runtime`，仓库不保存登录凭据。
+本目录实现 T-009～T-012、T-015～T-016 的 PostgreSQL `17.10` schema。SQL 必须按文件名前缀顺序执行：`001`～`004` 创建 NOLOGIN 权限角色、Bell/Sense 初始对象和配额权限；`005`～`007` 增量增加 Area 与本地审计；`008`～`009` 增加 Control API 状态；`010`～`011` 增加调和 fencing、MediaMTX Path 历史归属、孤儿报告/受控处置结果；`012`～`013` 增加 Bell 不可变事件、append-only outcome 和独立 `bell_runtime` 最小权限；`014`～`015` 增加审计 Outbox relay fencing、Bell 全局审计事实、短期防重收据和双方最小权限。全部 SQL 可重放。对象 owner/迁移角色为 `bell_app`/`sense_app`；应用登录角色及密码由部署环境或密钥系统创建，Sense 登录加入 `sense_app`，Bell 运行登录只加入 `bell_runtime`，仓库不保存登录凭据。

 生产/共享实例必须由管理员先备份并在 YoVision 专用数据库中执行。Sense 进程不会用高权限自动建库或建角色。示例只使用私有环境变量，不把实际 DSN 写入脚本或日志：

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ Get-ChildItem deploy/postgres/[0-9][0-9][0-9]_*.sql |
 - `bell_app` 拥有 `bell.sites`/`bell.areas`、版本 trigger、`bell.site_quota_v1` 和 `bell.area_policy_v1`。
 - `sense_app` 拥有 `sense` schema，只获得 `bell` schema 的 `USAGE` 和两个投影视图的 `SELECT`。
 - `sense_app` 对 Bell 源表、Bell migration 表和 trigger function 没有权限；启动检查发现权限过宽时拒绝运行。
- `sense.device_operation_outbox` 是本地持久化审计事实，不是 Bell 全局审计真相；relay 的传输、签名、确认和留存尚未实现。
+- `sense.device_operation_outbox` 是本地持久化队列，Bell 全局审计真相只写入 `bell.audit_events`。Sense 只领取/确认本地行，不获得 Bell 表权限；Bell 只通过签名 HTTP ingress 收取，不读取 Outbox。
+- `bell.audit_events` 与事件事实一样不可更新/删除；`bell.audit_relay_receipts` 只为 10 分钟 nonce 幂等窗口保留，Bell runtime 仅可在这张限定表中查询、插入和清理过期记录。
 - `bell.events` 与 `bell.event_outcomes` 由 `bell_app` 拥有；`bell_runtime` 只获得 `SELECT/INSERT`，没有 owner、`UPDATE`、`DELETE` 或 `TRUNCATE` 权限，数据库 trigger 再拒绝 owner 路径的意外事实改写。
 - `sense.control_idempotency_receipts` 不保存原始 Idempotency-Key，只保存 scope/request SHA-256 和脱敏响应快照；`batch_operations`/items 只保存逻辑 ID、状态和稳定错误，不保存连接秘密。
 - 调和与孤儿租约使用 PostgreSQL `clock_timestamp()` 和 fencing token；过期 worker 不能提交完成/失败或扫描报告。`media_path_ownership`、扫描和处置表不保存 endpoint、credential 或 source URI；数据库约束禁止为 `unowned` finding 写删除结果。
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ BEGIN
       OR NOT has_table_privilege('sense_app', 'sense.device_operation_outbox', 'DELETE') THEN
        RAISE EXCEPTION 'sense_app lacks access to its local audit Outbox';
    END IF;
-    IF (SELECT max(version) FROM bell.schema_migrations) <> 3
-       OR (SELECT max(version) FROM sense.schema_migrations) <> 5 THEN
+    IF (SELECT max(version) FROM bell.schema_migrations) <> 4
+       OR (SELECT max(version) FROM sense.schema_migrations) <> 6 THEN
        RAISE EXCEPTION 'schema migration version drift';
    END IF;

@@ -201,3 +201,30 @@ BEGIN
    END IF;
 END
 $reconcile_safety$;
+
+DO $audit_relay$
+BEGIN
+    IF NOT has_table_privilege('yovision_t012_sense', 'sense.device_operation_outbox', 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE')
+       OR has_table_privilege('yovision_t012_sense', 'bell.audit_events', 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE')
+       OR has_table_privilege('yovision_t012_sense', 'bell.audit_relay_receipts', 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE') THEN
+        RAISE EXCEPTION 'Sense runtime violates audit relay schema ownership';
+    END IF;
+    IF NOT has_table_privilege('yovision_t015_bell', 'bell.audit_events', 'SELECT,INSERT')
+       OR has_table_privilege('yovision_t015_bell', 'bell.audit_events', 'UPDATE,DELETE,TRUNCATE')
+       OR NOT has_table_privilege('yovision_t015_bell', 'bell.audit_relay_receipts', 'SELECT,INSERT,DELETE')
+       OR has_table_privilege('yovision_t015_bell', 'bell.audit_relay_receipts', 'UPDATE,TRUNCATE') THEN
+        RAISE EXCEPTION 'Bell runtime violates audit relay privileges';
+    END IF;
+    IF has_table_privilege('public', 'bell.audit_events', 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE,TRUNCATE')
+       OR has_table_privilege('public', 'bell.audit_relay_receipts', 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE,TRUNCATE') THEN
+        RAISE EXCEPTION 'Bell audit relay tables leaked to PUBLIC';
+    END IF;
+    IF NOT EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
+        WHERE table_schema='sense' AND table_name='device_operation_outbox'
+          AND column_name='relay_lease_token'
+    ) THEN
+        RAISE EXCEPTION 'Sense audit relay fencing columns are missing';
+    END IF;
+END
+$audit_relay$;
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ MVP 以默认 16 路跑通一个场景的端到端闭环；架构、数据和 UI

 ## 当前阶段

-当前为 **M0 指定型号实机准入、M1 Sense 五路混合源集成和 M2 本地 16 路软件基线均已完成，M3 已建立 Bell 不可变事件存储基础**。后续本地开发统一使用已准入的一台海康样机，多路软件闭环使用独立合成 RTSP 源补足；真实多设备证据延后到客户/借用/租赁条件具备时执行。客户网络尚未提供，T-013 WireGuard 继续后置，不阻塞 Sense Outbox → Bell 审计 relay。
+当前为 **M0 指定型号实机准入、M1 Sense 五路混合源集成和 M2 本地 16 路软件基线均已完成，M3 已建立 Bell 不可变事件存储及 Sense→Bell 全局审计 relay 基础**。后续本地开发统一使用已准入的一台海康样机，多路软件闭环使用独立合成 RTSP 源补足；真实多设备证据延后到客户/借用/租赁条件具备时执行。客户网络尚未提供，T-013 WireGuard 继续后置，不阻塞 Brain/Bell 本地事件链开发。

 优先路径：

@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ T-014 没有增加生产依赖。Windows 容量脚本冻结并核对 Sense 模

 T-015 不冻结 Brain→Bell transport，也不产生可部署 Bell API 二进制。内部 factory 接收不含 `id` 的候选事实，由 Bell 生成 ULID 后才形成最终 v0.1 事件；不得把该 Go 类型当成公共网络协议。

+### 1.4 Sense 审计 relay（T-016）
+
+T-016 不增加第三方依赖：两端使用 Go 标准库 HTTP、HMAC-SHA256、SHA-256、base64url 和 constant-time compare，数据库继续使用已冻结的 PostgreSQL 17.10/pgx。`cmd/bell-api` 只提供回环 health/ready 和 Sense 审计内部端点；非回环监听必须同时提供绝对路径 TLS 证书/私钥。HMAC key 使用仓库外 version 1 JSON 文件，secret 至少 32 字节；该适配器不替代未来 Bell 公共 JWT/OIDC。
+
 ## 2. 外部项目边界

 - MiBeeNvr：只用于 M0 隔离实验室、ONVIF兼容性和交互参考，不作为生产依赖。
@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@ T-015 不冻结 Brain→Bell transport，也不产生可部署 Bell API 二进

 - Python、Savant/DeepStream 的精确版本；Go、MediaMTX 与 PostgreSQL 已分别为 Sense M1/M2 冻结，后续阶段可按升级流程调整。
 - Bell 前端框架和组件库。
- 事件投递 transport 从 HTTP 起步还是直接采用消息总线。
+- Brain→Bell 业务事件投递 transport；Sense→Bell 审计 relay 已独立冻结为内部 HTTP，不能据此默认 Brain transport。
 - 目标 GPU/边缘硬件、解码能力和每 worker 的 `max_sources`。
 - MinIO/S3 的精确版本、加密实现，以及客户/法务确认后的最终生命周期策略。
 - 短信/语音供应商及生产双路径组合；是否开发原生 App 最早在 M4 根据试点反馈决定。
@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ go -C Sense build ./...
 go -C Sense run ./cmd/sense-api
 ```

-Bell 事件域基础单独执行（当前没有可启动 API）：
+Bell 事件域与内部审计 receiver 单独执行：

 ```powershell
 go -C Bell mod download
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Sense ── 视频流/触发信号 ──> Brain
 9. 投递状态机只依赖 Bell provider 接口，不直接依赖某家短信或语音 SDK；生产前至少两条独立路径并能故障切换。
 10. 设备领域模型使用 `modality + capabilities`，页面不以摄像头作为唯一根实体；未实现协议适配器明确为 `adapter_not_ready`，不得用模拟遥测伪装交付。
 11. Tenant/Site/Area/RBAC、配额、`capture_policy` 与全局审计属于 Bell；Sense Control API v1 只管理 Device 期望态与收敛查询，Sense 只读消费版本化投影并在设备写路径执行，投影不可用时只阻断相关新变更，不静默切断已有链路。
-12. Sense 的设备操作审计先写本地持久化 Outbox，再由幂等 relay 异步送入 Bell 全局审计；不得使用“先执行高风险操作、再尽力入队”的顺序。T-010 已冻结脱敏本地事件并实现原子写入；relay 的 transport、签名、确认、重放窗口与留存仍须独立冻结。
+12. Sense 的设备操作审计先写本地持久化 Outbox，再由幂等 relay 异步送入 Bell 全局审计；不得使用“先执行高风险操作、再尽力入队”的顺序。T-016 已实现 HMAC/nonce 内部 HTTP relay、数据库时钟 lease/fencing、逐项确认与 Bell 不可变全局事实；Sense 不获得 Bell schema 权限，Bell 不读取 Sense Outbox。

 ## 6. 容量架构

@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ T-014 已在单台 Windows 主机上用隔离 PostgreSQL、真实 Control API、
 - MediaMTX Path 扫描把“Sense 历史拥有但当前失配”和“从未归属 Sense”分开；未知归属永不自动删除。历史拥有项也只允许在 15 分钟二次快照、1～128 项和 `候选 × 100 <= 当前 Path 总数 × 10` 全部通过时由本地运维命令逐项处置，不提供绕过。
 - `bell.site_quota_v1` 行缺失、数值越界、版本回退或读取失败只阻止视频设备新增/启用，不中断已有流；降低配额导致超限时不自动停用，后续准入返回稳定错误并产生运维信号。多 Sense 实例使用 PostgreSQL transaction-scoped advisory lock 串行化同 tenant/site 的计数与写入，不能用进程内锁替代。
 - `bell.area_policy_v1` 缺失、非法、版本回退或读取失败时，PostgreSQL repository 拒绝相关新增/启用；`non_imaging_only` 允许非成像设备但拒绝具有 `video_capture` 的设备。已有设备保持原状态，策略冲突由 Bell 管理端显式迁移或取消。同库实时视图不以源记录年龄误判 freshness。
- 设备创建和期望态受理在本地事务内同时写脱敏 `sense.device_operation_outbox`；Outbox 失败回滚业务写入，相同期望态不增加 generation 但仍审计。异步 relay 尚未实现。
+- 设备创建和期望态受理在本地事务内同时写脱敏 `sense.device_operation_outbox`；Outbox 失败回滚业务写入，相同期望态不增加 generation 但仍审计。relay 最多领取 100 行，以 30 秒数据库 lease 和单调 fencing token 防止过期 worker 确认；成功和 dead letter 都保留本地事实。
+- Bell 先验证时间窗、nonce 和 constant-time HMAC，再逐项校验 v1/v2 事件；同 nonce/同摘要重放原结果，同 nonce/不同摘要拒绝。`bell.audit_events` 只追加且不自动清理，只有 10 分钟幂等收据允许 Bell runtime 删除过期行。
 - Bell 最终事件写入 `bell.events`；同平台 ID/同摘要仅视为幂等重放，同 ID/不同摘要拒绝。`bell_runtime` 只有 `SELECT/INSERT`，事件与 outcome 的 UPDATE/DELETE 另由数据库 trigger 拒绝；后续人工/自动 outcome 追加到独立表，不改写事件 payload。
 - Brain 投递失败落本地队列重试，不阻塞实时推理主链路。
 - Alert 先落库再投递，进程重启恢复未完成升级链。
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ T-014 已在单台 Windows 主机上用隔离 PostgreSQL、真实 Control API、
 ## 8. 数据与契约

 - Bell 核心实体：Tenant → Site → Area（含 `capture_policy`）以及 Role/Binding/Quota/Audit；Sense 核心实体：Device（含 `modality + capabilities`）→ StreamBinding/Zone，以及只记录已观察版本的 SiteQuota/AreaPolicyProjection。两个 schema 以稳定逻辑 ID 关联，不跨 schema 写入；配额 v1 为五列，Area v1 固定为 `tenant_id/site_id/area_id/capture_policy/source_version/source_updated_at` 六列。
- Sense Control API v1 使用站点作用域路径、认证上下文 tenant、HMAC cursor 分页、PostgreSQL 幂等收据与资源 ETag；敏感连接引用只写不读。T-011 已实现 7 个 handler，并以 feature flag 限定到 PostgreSQL 路径；首版外部静态 SHA-256 注册表只实现认证 port 的私有部署适配器。正式签名和兼容规则以 [`contracts/`](contracts/) 为准，Bell 管理服务、JWT/OIDC 与 Outbox relay 仍未实现。
+- Sense Control API v1 使用站点作用域路径、认证上下文 tenant、HMAC cursor 分页、PostgreSQL 幂等收据与资源 ETag；敏感连接引用只写不读。T-011 已实现 7 个 handler，并以 feature flag 限定到 PostgreSQL 路径；首版外部静态 SHA-256 注册表只实现认证 port 的私有部署适配器。T-016 审计 relay 采用独立外部 HMAC key 文件和内部端点，不等同于 Bell 公共管理认证。正式签名和兼容规则以 [`contracts/`](contracts/) 为准。
 - 业务实体：Rule → Event → Alert → DeliveryAttempt/Ack；Event 与 Alert 不合并。
 - Bell 通知域分为三个聚合：Contact/Team 保存身份、成员关系和已验证通道；OnCallSchedule/ScheduleVersion/ShiftException 保存时区、轮换与例外；EscalationPolicy/Step 通过 `person / team / on_call_schedule` 类型化 `target_ref` 引用目标。三者共享逻辑 ID，不复制手机号、班次或轮换字段。
 - 每个 DeliveryAttempt 创建时解析当时生效的排班版本，并保存实际收件人、通道、`schedule_version` 和解析时间快照；之后联系人或排班修改不得回写既有投递事实。
@@ -114,10 +115,10 @@ Sense/cmd + Sense/internal/{device,onvif,mtx,reconcile,orphan,metrics,probe,trig
 Brain/{pipeline,models,judge,emit,trigger,contracts}
 Bell/cmd + Bell/internal/{ingest,event,rule,alert,deliver,feedback,tenant,audit,store}
 Bell/{web,packs,contracts}
-deploy/postgres/{001_roles.sql,...,013_privileges_bell_events.sql,tests}
+deploy/postgres/{001_roles.sql,...,015_privileges_audit_relay.sql,tests}
 ```

-Sense 脚手架和 PostgreSQL `001`～`013` 已实现；Bell 已有事件校验/不可变存储 Go 基础，但没有可部署 API 服务，Brain 仍为目录占位。
+Sense 脚手架和 PostgreSQL `001`～`015` 已实现；Bell 已有事件校验/不可变存储 Go 基础和只面向 Sense 审计 relay 的最小 `bell-api`，但没有公共管理 API，Brain 仍为目录占位。

 ## 10. 开发顺序

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 - Brain 模型接口、判定内核和 v0.1 mapper。
 - Bell 事件校验、不可变存储和 ULID。
 - T-015：建立 Bell Go 事件域基础，复制并校验冻结 v0.1 schema，由 Bell 生成平台 ULID，执行六项代码断言，并以 `bell_runtime` 最小权限保存不可变事件和 append-only outcome；不冻结 Brain transport 或公共 API。
+- T-016：冻结并实现 Sense Outbox → Bell 内部审计 relay；使用 HMAC、nonce 收据、数据库时钟 lease/fencing、逐项确认和 dead letter，在不共享 schema 权限的前提下写入 Bell 不可变全局审计事实。
 - 规则引擎、场景包加载、预警状态机与双路径投递。
 - 最小 Web/App 处置流程、RBAC 与审计。
 - 现场误报基线和反馈队列。
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # API 与契约

-> Brain → Bell 事件契约 v0.1、Sense Control API v1、Bell 配额/Area 只读投影 v1 与 Sense 本地设备审计事件 v1/v2 已冻结；其他 API 仍在设计阶段。不得把本文的“待定”自行具体化为公共契约。
+> Brain → Bell 事件契约 v0.1、Sense Control API v1、Bell 配额/Area 只读投影 v1、Sense 本地设备审计事件 v1/v2 与 Sense→Bell 审计 relay v1 已冻结；其他 API 仍在设计阶段。不得把本文的“待定”自行具体化为公共契约。

 ## 1. 已冻结：Brain → Bell 事件契约

@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ T-015 已实现 Bell 消费端的内部组装与存储边界：可信 ingress
 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | Sense → Bell | 读取站点视频配额 | 同一 PostgreSQL 实例内只读 `bell.site_quota_v1`；默认 16、最大 128；失败时拒绝新增/启用但不影响已有流 | T-008 冻结，T-009 已实现数据路径 |
 | Sense → Bell | 读取 Area 成像准入 | 只读 `bell.area_policy_v1`；`video_allowed | non_imaging_only`；缺失/非法/回退失败关闭但不影响已有设备 | T-010 已冻结并实现数据路径 |
-| Sense → Bell | 汇入设备操作审计 | 本地 Outbox 事件已冻结并原子落库；transport、签名、确认与留存未冻结 | T-010 本地基础已实现，relay 待设计 |
+| Sense → Bell | 汇入设备操作审计 | `POST /internal/v1/audit-events:batch`；1～100 项、1 MiB、10 秒 deadline、HMAC/nonce、逐项确认；非回环必须 HTTPS | T-016 已冻结并实现 |
 | Bell → Sense | 请求事件证据/pre-roll 切片 | 幂等、按租户授权、异步结果、不得暴露原始凭据 | 待 M3 设计 |
 | Bell → Brain | outcome/误报反馈 | 原事件不可变；反馈可重试、去重、审计 | 待 M3 设计 |
 | Sense → Brain | 流绑定与设备型触发 | 分片可路由，触发入口与流控制解耦 | 待 M2/M3 设计 |
 | Worker → 控制面 | 注册、心跳、容量 | `max_sources` 来自 profile/压测，不固定为 16 | 待 M3 设计 |

-冻结签名和失败语义见 [`contracts/README.md`](contracts/README.md)、[`contracts/site-quota-v1.sql`](contracts/site-quota-v1.sql)、[`contracts/area-policy-v1.sql`](contracts/area-policy-v1.sql) 与 [`contracts/sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json`](contracts/sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json)。Bell 拥有投影源数据和视图，Sense 数据库角色只有 `SELECT`；未来分库必须发布新版本，不能在 v1 下把本地视图静默替换为网络调用。
+冻结签名和失败语义见 [`contracts/README.md`](contracts/README.md)、[`contracts/sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json`](contracts/sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json)、[`contracts/site-quota-v1.sql`](contracts/site-quota-v1.sql)、[`contracts/area-policy-v1.sql`](contracts/area-policy-v1.sql) 与 [`contracts/sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json`](contracts/sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json)。Bell 拥有投影源数据和视图，Sense 数据库角色只有 `SELECT`；未来分库必须发布新版本，不能在 v1 下把本地视图静默替换为网络调用。

 ## 3. 已冻结：Sense Control API v1

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ T-015 已实现 Bell 消费端的内部组装与存储边界：可信 ingress
 - `endpoint_ref`、`credential_ref`、`profile_token` 只写不读；设备 ID 由服务端生成。普通响应和错误不得包含凭据、完整流 URI、token 或 MediaMTX 内部配置。
 - v1 不提供删除设备；停用设备保留历史。写入受理只表示期望态已持久化，不能表示实际态已收敛。

-T-008 冻结公共控制契约；T-009/T-010 建立 PostgreSQL 投影、准入和本地审计基础；T-011 已实现 7 个 HTTP handler、外部静态摘要认证适配器、tenant/Site scope、幂等收据、ETag/HMAC cursor 和持久化 batch operation。业务路由默认关闭且仅可在 PostgreSQL 上开启；Bell 管理服务、JWT/OIDC 和 Outbox relay 尚未实现。
+T-008 冻结公共控制契约；T-009/T-010 建立 PostgreSQL 投影、准入和本地审计基础；T-011 已实现 7 个 HTTP handler、外部静态摘要认证适配器、tenant/Site scope、幂等收据、ETag/HMAC cursor 和持久化 batch operation。业务路由默认关闭且仅可在 PostgreSQL 上开启；T-016 的审计 relay 是独立内部端点，不替代 Bell 管理服务或 JWT/OIDC。

 ## 4. 待冻结的 Bell 公共 API

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Sense 控制面、准入投影与本地审计契约 v1

-> 冻结日期：2026-08-07。Control API 契约版本：`1.0.0`。Sense 是设备期望态的提供方；Bell 是 Tenant、Site、Area、RBAC、配额与全局审计的所有者。T-011 已实现 Control API handler 与 PostgreSQL 一致性边界；Bell 管理服务、JWT/OIDC 和 Outbox relay 仍未实现。
+> 冻结日期：2026-08-11。Control API 与审计 relay 契约版本：`1.0.0`。Sense 是设备期望态的提供方；Bell 是 Tenant、Site、Area、RBAC、配额与全局审计的所有者。T-016 已实现 Sense Outbox 到 Bell 的内部 relay；Bell 公共管理服务与 JWT/OIDC 仍未实现。

 ## 契约文件

@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@
 | [`sense-control-v1.openapi.json`](sense-control-v1.openapi.json) | Sense | Bell 管理面、受控集成方 | 设备查询、创建、修改、启停与批量操作 |
 | [`site-quota-v1.sql`](site-quota-v1.sql) | Bell | Sense | 单 PostgreSQL 实例内的站点视频配额只读投影 |
 | [`area-policy-v1.sql`](area-policy-v1.sql) | Bell | Sense | Area 归属与 `capture_policy` 只读投影 |
-| [`sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json`](sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json) | Sense | 本地 Outbox；未来 Bell relay | 脱敏设备操作审计事实，不包含传输协议 |
-| [`sense-device-audit-v2.schema.json`](sense-device-audit-v2.schema.json) | Sense | 本地 Outbox；未来 Bell relay | v1 后继，增加脱敏配置修改受理事实；v1 文件保持不变 |
+| [`sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json`](sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json) | Sense | 本地 Outbox；Bell relay | 脱敏设备操作审计事实，不包含传输协议 |
+| [`sense-device-audit-v2.schema.json`](sense-device-audit-v2.schema.json) | Sense | 本地 Outbox；Bell relay | v1 后继，增加脱敏配置修改受理事实；v1 文件保持不变 |
+| [`sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json`](sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json) | Bell | Sense | 内部批量端点、HMAC、逐项确认、nonce 防重与重试边界 |

 OpenAPI 的 `/api/v1` 路径是公共控制面边界；`/healthz`、`/readyz` 仍是非业务运维探针。v1 不提供设备删除：停用设备使用期望态接口，保留设备、操作和审计历史。Site、Area、配额、RBAC 和审计聚合不由 Sense 提供 CRUD。

@@ -57,7 +58,19 @@ T-010 冻结 `bell.area_policy_v1` 的列顺序为 `tenant_id/site_id/area_id/ca

 `sense-device-audit-v1.schema.json` 继续冻结创建与期望态两类事实且不原地扩展严格枚举。T-011 新增 v2 后继，兼容 v1 两类事件并增加 `device.configuration.accepted`；该 payload 只保存是否变化、字段名和 Area 逻辑 ID，不保存字段值。主体类型为 `user | service | system`，投影版本与 generation 随事实保存；endpoint、credential、profile token、path、密码、完整流 URI 或 MediaMTX 配置始终禁止进入审计。

-PostgreSQL repository 必须在设备创建/期望态事务内写 `sense.device_operation_outbox`；Outbox 失败回滚业务写入。相同期望态不增加 generation，但仍产生独立审计事实。Schema 不是 Bell relay 协议：传输端点、签名、批量确认、重放窗口和留存由后续任务冻结。
+PostgreSQL repository 必须在设备创建/期望态事务内写 `sense.device_operation_outbox`；Outbox 失败回滚业务写入。相同期望态不增加 generation，但仍产生独立审计事实。事件 schema 继续只定义事实；传输由 `sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json` 独立冻结。
+
+## Sense → Bell 审计 relay
+
+Sense 向 `/internal/v1/audit-events:batch` 每批发送 1～100 个事件，请求体不超过 1 MiB、deadline 10 秒。请求用外部文件中的至少 32 字节 secret 做 HMAC-SHA256，canonical string 为 method、path、Unix 秒、随机 nonce 与 body SHA-256 的换行拼接；非回环地址必须使用 HTTPS。Bell 允许 300 秒时钟偏差并将 `(key_id, nonce)` 收据保留 600 秒：相同请求摘要返回原结果，不同摘要返回 `409 replay_conflict`。
+
+Outbox 用 30 秒数据库时钟 lease、单调 fencing token 和 `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` 协调实例。`accepted/duplicate` 才标记 delivered；逐项 `rejected` 进入 dead letter；网络、5xx、认证失败或缺失结果以 1 秒起步、最多 300 秒指数退避。Sense 不直接访问 Bell schema，Bell 不读取 Sense Outbox；全局 `bell.audit_events` 不自动删除，只有短期 relay receipt 自动过期。
+
+两端读取同格式的仓库外 key 文件；Bell 可同时接受多个 key，Sense 用 `SENSE_AUDIT_RELAY_KEY_ID` 选择一个，便于先加新 key、切换发送端、再移除旧 key。占位结构如下，`secret_base64url` 必须替换为至少 32 个随机字节的无填充 base64url，不能提交真实值：
+
+```json
+{"version":1,"keys":[{"key_id":"sense-a","secret_base64url":"<external-secret>"}]}
+```

 ## 兼容与废弃

@@ -73,8 +86,10 @@ PostgreSQL repository 必须在设备创建/期望态事务内写 `sense.device_
 ```powershell
 python -m json.tool docs/contracts/sense-control-v1.openapi.json | Out-Null
 python -m json.tool docs/contracts/sense-device-audit-v2.schema.json | Out-Null
+python -m json.tool docs/contracts/sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json | Out-Null
 python -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_sense_control_contract.py"
 python -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_sense_control_implementation.py"
+python -m unittest discover -s tests -p "test_sense_audit_relay_contract.py"
 ```

 测试同时校验 OpenAPI 结构、生成 server glue、HTTP handler 与 PostgreSQL migration/事务；它不替代 Bell 消费方联合验收或客户现场容量验证。
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+{
+  "openapi": "3.1.0",
+  "info": {
+    "title": "YoVision Sense Audit Relay",
+    "version": "1.0.0",
+    "description": "Internal, signed and idempotent delivery of redacted Sense device audit facts to Bell."
+  },
+  "paths": {
+    "/internal/v1/audit-events:batch": {
+      "post": {
+        "operationId": "receiveSenseAuditBatch",
+        "description": "Accepts 1-100 events in a body no larger than 1048576 bytes. The request deadline is 10 seconds. HMAC clock skew is at most 300 seconds and nonce receipts live for 600 seconds.",
+        "parameters": [
+          {"name": "X-YoVision-Key-Id", "in": "header", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"}},
+          {"name": "X-YoVision-Timestamp", "in": "header", "required": true, "description": "Unix seconds", "schema": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9]{10,}$"}},
+          {"name": "X-YoVision-Nonce", "in": "header", "required": true, "description": "16-48 random bytes encoded as unpadded base64url", "schema": {"type": "string", "minLength": 22, "maxLength": 64, "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$"}},
+          {"name": "X-YoVision-Signature", "in": "header", "required": true, "description": "Unpadded base64url HMAC-SHA256 over POST, path, timestamp, nonce and lowercase SHA-256 body digest joined by newlines", "schema": {"type": "string", "minLength": 43, "maxLength": 43}}
+        ],
+        "requestBody": {
+          "required": true,
+          "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/BatchRequest"}}}
+        },
+        "responses": {
+          "200": {"description": "Stored, duplicate or permanently rejected per item. Same key ID, nonce and request digest returns the original response.", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/BatchResponse"}}}},
+          "400": {"description": "Malformed batch envelope"},
+          "401": {"description": "Invalid key, timestamp, nonce or signature"},
+          "409": {"description": "Same key ID and nonce used with a different request digest; error is replay_conflict"},
+          "413": {"description": "Body exceeds 1048576 bytes"},
+          "503": {"description": "Bell cannot atomically persist the batch and receipt"}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "components": {
+    "schemas": {
+      "BatchRequest": {
+        "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["events"],
+        "properties": {"events": {"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "maxItems": 100, "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/Envelope"}}}
+      },
+      "Envelope": {
+        "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["schema_version", "event"],
+        "properties": {
+          "schema_version": {"type": "integer", "enum": [1, 2]},
+          "event": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/AuditEvent"}
+        }
+      },
+      "AuditEvent": {
+        "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["event_id", "event_type", "tenant_id", "site_id", "device_id", "actor", "reason", "trace_id", "aggregate_generation", "projection_versions", "data", "occurred_at"],
+        "properties": {
+          "event_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^audit_[0-9a-f]{32}$"},
+          "event_type": {"type": "string", "enum": ["device.created", "device.desired_state.accepted", "device.configuration.accepted"]},
+          "tenant_id": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/LogicalId"},
+          "site_id": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/LogicalId"},
+          "device_id": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/LogicalId"},
+          "actor": {"type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["type", "id"], "properties": {"type": {"type": "string", "enum": ["user", "service", "system"]}, "id": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 200}}},
+          "reason": {"type": ["string", "null"], "maxLength": 500},
+          "trace_id": {"type": ["string", "null"], "maxLength": 128},
+          "aggregate_generation": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1},
+          "projection_versions": {"type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["quota_source_version", "area_policy_source_version"], "properties": {"quota_source_version": {"type": ["integer", "null"], "minimum": 1}, "area_policy_source_version": {"type": ["integer", "null"], "minimum": 1}}},
+          "data": {"type": "object"},
+          "occurred_at": {"type": "string", "format": "date-time"}
+        }
+      },
+      "LogicalId": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128, "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]*$"},
+      "BatchResponse": {
+        "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["results"],
+        "properties": {"results": {"type": "array", "minItems": 1, "maxItems": 100, "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/Result"}}}
+      },
+      "Result": {
+        "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["event_id", "status"],
+        "properties": {
+          "event_id": {"type": "string"},
+          "status": {"type": "string", "enum": ["accepted", "duplicate", "rejected"]},
+          "error_code": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{0,63}$"}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "x-yovision-signature": {
+    "canonical": "METHOD\\nPATH\\nTIMESTAMP\\nNONCE\\nLOWERCASE_SHA256_BODY",
+    "algorithm": "HMAC-SHA256",
+    "encoding": "base64url-no-padding",
+    "clock_skew_seconds": 300,
+    "receipt_ttl_seconds": 600
+  },
+  "x-yovision-delivery": {
+    "lease_seconds": 30,
+    "initial_retry_seconds": 1,
+    "maximum_retry_seconds": 300,
+    "successful_statuses": ["accepted", "duplicate"],
+    "permanent_status": "rejected"
+  }
+}
@@ -1,28 +1,29 @@
 # 当前实现状态

-> 快照日期：2026-08-10。只记录仓库现实与 blocker；任务实时状态到 Gitea Issue 查看。
+> 快照日期：2026-08-11。只记录仓库现实与 blocker；任务实时状态到 Gitea Issue 查看。

 ## 当前阶段

- 阶段：M0 指定摄像头型号准入、M1“一实机 + 四合成源”软件闭环和 M2 本地 16 路批量收敛/稳定基线已通过；M3 已建立 Bell 不可变事件存储基础。客户网络尚未提供，WireGuard T-013 后置，五条独立真实上游和生产 SLA 仍未验收。下一开发重点是 Sense Outbox → Bell 全局审计 relay。
- 生产代码：Sense 已包含可构建进程、SQLite/PostgreSQL repository、Site/Area 准入、设备操作 Outbox、标准 ONVIF SOAP/WS-Security adapter、凭据引用、MediaMTX 生成客户端、Control API v1、对账/探活、数据库租约、孤儿只读扫描/受控命令、低基数指标和可重复 16 路容量脚本；Bell 已包含可构建 Go module、事件 v0.1 schema/语义校验、平台 ULID、不可变 PostgreSQL repository 和 append-only outcome，但仍没有可部署 API、管理服务/JWT、Outbox relay、规则/Alert 或 Web/H5。
+- 阶段：M0 指定摄像头型号准入、M1“一实机 + 四合成源”软件闭环和 M2 本地 16 路批量收敛/稳定基线已通过；M3 已建立 Bell 不可变事件存储及 Sense→Bell 全局审计 relay 基础。客户网络尚未提供，WireGuard T-013 后置，五条独立真实上游和生产 SLA 仍未验收。
+- 生产代码：Sense 已包含可构建进程、SQLite/PostgreSQL repository、Site/Area 准入、设备操作 Outbox、可选签名 relay、标准 ONVIF SOAP/WS-Security adapter、凭据引用、MediaMTX 生成客户端、Control API v1、对账/探活、数据库租约、孤儿只读扫描/受控命令、低基数指标和可重复 16 路容量脚本；Bell 已包含事件 v0.1 校验/不可变存储、append-only outcome，以及只服务 Sense 审计的最小 `bell-api` 和全局审计 repository，但仍没有 Brain 事件 ingress、公共管理服务/JWT、规则/Alert 或 Web/H5。
 - 默认容量：16 路；单站点本阶段上限 128 路，必须横向分片。

 ## 仓库现实

- `Sense/` 已有 Go module 与 `cmd/sense-api`；`Bell/` 已有事件域 Go module 但没有 `cmd/bell-api`；`Brain/` 仍只有目录占位。Bell/Sense migration 统一位于根目录 `deploy/postgres/`。
+- `Sense/` 已有 Go module 与 `cmd/sense-api`；`Bell/` 已有事件域 Go module 和最小 `cmd/bell-api` 内部审计 receiver；`Brain/` 仍只有目录占位。Bell/Sense migration 统一位于根目录 `deploy/postgres/`。
 - Sense 设备模型使用 `modality + capabilities`，SQLite 执行 v1 migration；视频配额默认 16、允许 1～128，17/128/129、新增/启用和“降低配额不关闭已有流”均有测试。
 - T-009 冻结 PostgreSQL `17.10` 和 `pgx/v5 v5.10.0`，实现 `bell`/`sense` schema、NOLOGIN 权限角色、Bell Site 版本 trigger、`bell.site_quota_v1` 和 Sense PostgreSQL repository；同站点并发准入用事务级 advisory lock，配额缺失/越界/版本回退时失败关闭且不改变已有流。
 - T-010 增量实现 `bell.areas`、`bell.area_policy_v1`、Area 版本观察和 `sense.device_operation_outbox`；`non_imaging_only` 拒绝成像设备创建/启用，失败不改变已有设备。设备创建/期望态受理与脱敏 Outbox 同事务，相同期望态不增加 generation 但仍审计。
- Windows 隔离测试使用 `D:\pgsql17\bin` 启动随机回环端口临时集群，`001`～`013` migration 可重放；Sense repository、Bell event repository、权限、幂等冲突与不可变性测试通过后自动清理，现有 `D:\pgsql17\data` 和 5432 服务未被读取、停止或修改。
+- Windows 隔离测试使用 `D:\pgsql17\bin` 启动随机回环端口临时集群，`001`～`015` migration 可重放；Sense Outbox fencing、Bell event/global-audit repository、nonce 收据、权限、幂等冲突与不可变性测试通过后自动清理，现有 `D:\pgsql17\data` 和 5432 服务未被读取、停止或修改。
 - T-015 冻结 Bell Go 1.26.5、JSON Schema v6.0.2 和 ULID v2.1.2；Bell 拒绝上游自报平台 ID，在内部 candidate 组装后执行冻结 v0.1 schema 与六项语义断言。`bell_runtime` 只允许追加/读取 `bell.events`、`bell.event_outcomes`；Brain transport、整数事件 ID 与现有文本逻辑 ID 的跨系统映射、公共 API 和生产隐私 resolver 仍未冻结，不能把内部 factory 当成已上线入口。
+- T-016 冻结 `sense-audit-relay-v1`：每批 1～100 项、1 MiB、10 秒 deadline、300 秒时钟窗、600 秒 nonce 收据、30 秒数据库 lease、1～300 秒退避。Sense 使用 `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` 和 fencing token；Bell constant-time 校验 HMAC，逐项返回 accepted/duplicate/rejected，并把全局事实追加到不可变 `bell.audit_events`。relay 默认关闭，非回环两端必须 HTTPS/TLS，key 只从仓库外文件读取。
 - MediaMTX 固定为独立二进制 `v1.19.3`，官方 OpenAPI 已按 SHA-256 vendoring，并由固定 `oapi-codegen v2.8.0` 生成客户端；手写薄封装有 create/read/delete、幂等 ensure、探活和只返回名称的受限分页枚举测试。
 - T-003 对账进度与指数退避持久化，覆盖取消和 SQLite 重启恢复；T-006 增加真实 ONVIF adapter、RTSP router、实验室播种/状态工具、故障代理和五路自动验收。T-012 的普通调和不枚举孤儿；独立 PostgreSQL 扫描默认只报告，未知归属永不删除。
 - T-006 正式使用 1 台准入实机和 4 个独立合成 publisher 连续观察 `1806.6 s` / 180 次采样，四类恢复均通过，最大与最终 `unconverged` 均为 0；详细证据见 `docs/research/sense-5-stream-integration.md`。
 - T-014 正式使用隔离 PostgreSQL、真实 Control API、两套 MediaMTX 和 16 个独立低码率合成 publisher，完成 17 路配额拒绝、三轮 `16 → 0 → 16` 批量收敛和固定四路故障恢复；稳定观察 `1800.1 s` / 180 次采样，最大与最终 `unconverged` 均为 0、最终在线 Path 16、帧错误 0。证据见 `docs/research/sense-16-stream-capacity.md`；不外推到真实 16 机、网络、录像、AI/GPU、64/128 路或生产 SLA。
 - `docs/raw/01`～`08` 已记录需求、分析、方案、客户场景、事件比对和三系统职责。
 - `docs/raw/contracts/event-v0.1.schema.json` 已冻结，并有多份示例与语义说明。
- `docs/contracts/sense-control-v1.openapi.json` 的 7 个站点作用域/operation endpoint 已由 T-011 实现：外部静态 SHA-256 主体注册表、tenant/Site scope、HMAC cursor、ETag、PostgreSQL 24 小时幂等收据和最多 128 项 batch operation 均有代码与隔离集成测试。默认 SQLite 只暴露运维探针与低基数 `/metrics`，不注册业务路由；Bell 管理服务、JWT/OIDC 和 Outbox relay 尚未实现。
+- `docs/contracts/sense-control-v1.openapi.json` 的 7 个站点作用域/operation endpoint 已由 T-011 实现；`sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json` 已由 T-016 实现。默认 SQLite 只暴露运维探针与低基数 `/metrics`，不注册业务路由或 relay；Bell 管理服务与 JWT/OIDC 尚未实现。
 - T-012 把 PostgreSQL schema 提升到 v5：due row 用数据库时钟、`FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`、逐项续租和 fencing token 协调；MediaMTX Path 历史归属、15 分钟孤儿快照、最多 10%/128 项安全闸、无 bypass 的本地处置命令及 `/metrics` 已实现。SQLite 明确保留单实例开发语义。
 - harness coding 文档、上下文清单、Gitea Issue/PR 模板和治理脚本已接入。
 - Gitea 已初始化 12 个协作标签；`status/waiting` 用于依赖或外部条件未满足的未领取任务，实时可领取状态必须从 Gitea 查询，不在本文复制。
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ Windows：
 go -C Sense run ./cmd/sense-api
 ```

-Bell 事件域基础验证（当前没有可启动 API）：
+Bell 事件域和内部审计 receiver 验证：

 ```powershell
 go -C Bell test ./...
@@ -86,12 +87,12 @@ Sense 默认监听 `127.0.0.1:8080`，提供 `/healthz`、`/readyz` 运维探针
 - 人脸方向已延后至 M5 的 S4 成人园区候选试点；必要性/PIP 影响评估、单独同意与替代方式、合法底库来源和删除流程未完成，阻塞人脸能力上线。
 - 短信/语音具体供应商未选；生产前必须选定两条独立投递路径并验证故障切换。
 - Python/Savant 的精确版本、目标硬件和 Bell 前端栈尚未冻结；Sense M1 的 Go、SQLite driver、MediaMTX、生成器及生成运行时版本已在 T-003 冻结，PostgreSQL/pgx 版本已在 T-009 冻结。
- 本机现有 PostgreSQL 5432 实例使用 SCRAM 且当前开发进程没有管理员密码；T-009～T-015 不绕过认证，自动验收使用隔离临时集群。向共享/生产实例安装 migration 前仍需管理员私下提供专用数据库、最小权限登录角色、外部 Control API 安全文件与备份方案。
+- 本机现有 PostgreSQL 5432 实例使用 SCRAM 且当前开发进程没有管理员密码；T-009～T-016 不绕过认证，自动验收使用隔离临时集群。向共享/生产实例安装 migration 前仍需管理员私下提供专用数据库、最小权限登录角色、外部 Control API/relay key 文件、TLS 证书与备份方案。
 - 代码知识图谱在无业务代码阶段可能为空；工具不可用时使用 `rg` 处理文档与配置。

 ## 下一步

-客户网络仍未提供，T-013 WireGuard 继续后置。Bell 不可变事件存储已由 T-015 落地；下一项是独立冻结并实现 Sense 设备操作 Outbox 到 Bell 全局审计的幂等 relay，不把 Brain 事件 transport、规则或 Alert 混入。客户授权、借用或租赁条件具备后再执行 T-007 五条独立真实上游现场门禁。T-014/T-015 不解除 T-007/T-013，也不形成真实多路或生产 SLA 承诺。
+客户网络仍未提供，T-013 WireGuard 继续后置。T-015/T-016 已分别落地 Bell 不可变事件存储和 Sense 全局审计 relay；下一项应独立冻结 Brain→Bell 业务事件 ingress，不把规则/Alert 或公共管理 API 混入。客户授权、借用或租赁条件具备后再执行 T-007 五条独立真实上游现场门禁。T-014～T-016 不解除 T-007/T-013，也不形成真实多路或生产 SLA 承诺。

 ## 已知风险

@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ id: T-016
 title: 冻结并实现 Sense Outbox 到 Bell 全局审计幂等 relay
 phase: 3
 deps: [T-015]
-status: TODO
+status: DONE
 created: 2026-08-10
 issue: 55
-context_ref: null
-claim_branch: null
-work_branch: null
+context_ref: aca22f4667f0da77a102eb7ba15a93c0128df656
+claim_branch: claims/T-016
+work_branch: agent/codex/T-016
 write_paths:
  - docs/tasks/T-016.md
  - docs/contracts/README.md
@@ -94,3 +94,7 @@ T-015 已提供 Bell 的独立运行角色和不可变事实模式。本任务
 ## 执行记录

 - 2026-08-10：在 T-015 合并并关闭后拆出本任务；实现尚未开始。
+- 2026-08-11：冻结 `sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json`，实现 Sense 外部 key/HMAC client、30 秒数据库 lease/fencing worker、逐项结果/dead letter/1～300 秒退避，以及 PostgreSQL v6 Outbox relay repository；默认关闭且远端 URL 强制 HTTPS。
+- 2026-08-11：实现 Bell 最小 `cmd/bell-api`、300 秒时间窗与 constant-time HMAC 校验、600 秒 nonce 幂等收据、逐项 v1/v2 校验，以及 PostgreSQL v4 不可变 `bell.audit_events`；Sense/Bell 登录权限保持单向隔离，只有 Bell 可清理过期收据。
+- 2026-08-11：`./init.ps1`、三条 Python 治理命令、Sense/Bell `test/vet/build` 与 `git diff --check` 全部通过；Python 共 68 项测试通过。
+- 2026-08-11：`./scripts/test_postgres.ps1 -PgRoot D:\pgsql17` 通过；PostgreSQL 17.10 临时集群将 `001`～`015` 重放两次，Sense fencing、Bell receipt/重复/冲突/不可变性和双方权限断言通过，随机端口与临时目录已清理，现有 5432 listener 未改变。
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ try {
            '010_reconcile_safety.sql',
            '011_privileges_reconcile_safety.sql',
            '012_bell_events.sql',
-            '013_privileges_bell_events.sql'
+            '013_privileges_bell_events.sql',
+            '014_audit_relay.sql',
+            '015_privileges_audit_relay.sql'
        )) {
            Invoke-Checked $psql '-X' '-v' 'ON_ERROR_STOP=1' '-d' $adminDatabaseDSN '-f' (Join-Path $repoRoot "deploy\postgres\$name")
        }
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ class PostgresContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
                "011_privileges_reconcile_safety.sql",
                "012_bell_events.sql",
                "013_privileges_bell_events.sql",
+                "014_audit_relay.sql",
+                "015_privileges_audit_relay.sql",
            ],
            names,
        )
@@ -129,6 +131,21 @@ class PostgresContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
            self.assertIn(marker, text)
        self.assertNotIn("D:\\pgsql17\\data", text)

+    def test_audit_relay_uses_fencing_and_separate_schema_ownership(self) -> None:
+        migration = normalized(migration_text("014_audit_relay.sql"))
+        privileges = normalized(migration_text("015_privileges_audit_relay.sql"))
+        for marker in (
+            "relay_lease_owner",
+            "relay_lease_token",
+            "relay_lease_until",
+            "create table if not exists bell.audit_events",
+            "create table if not exists bell.audit_relay_receipts",
+            "expires_at >= received_at + interval '10 minutes'",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(marker, migration)
+        self.assertIn("grant select, insert on table bell.audit_events to bell_runtime", privileges)
+        self.assertIn("revoke all on table bell.audit_events, bell.audit_relay_receipts from sense_app", privileges)
+

 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Cross-language invariants for the Sense-to-Bell audit relay contract."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+CONTRACT = ROOT / "docs" / "contracts" / "sense-audit-relay-v1.openapi.json"
+
+
+class SenseAuditRelayContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
+        cls.document = json.loads(CONTRACT.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+    def test_transport_and_response_are_frozen(self) -> None:
+        operation = self.document["paths"]["/internal/v1/audit-events:batch"]["post"]
+        self.assertEqual({"200", "400", "401", "409", "413", "503"}, set(operation["responses"]))
+        headers = {item["name"] for item in operation["parameters"]}
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {"X-YoVision-Key-Id", "X-YoVision-Timestamp", "X-YoVision-Nonce", "X-YoVision-Signature"},
+            headers,
+        )
+
+    def test_numeric_safety_bounds_match_task(self) -> None:
+        events = self.document["components"]["schemas"]["BatchRequest"]["properties"]["events"]
+        self.assertEqual((1, 100), (events["minItems"], events["maxItems"]))
+        signature = self.document["x-yovision-signature"]
+        delivery = self.document["x-yovision-delivery"]
+        self.assertEqual(300, signature["clock_skew_seconds"])
+        self.assertEqual(600, signature["receipt_ttl_seconds"])
+        self.assertEqual((30, 1, 300), (delivery["lease_seconds"], delivery["initial_retry_seconds"], delivery["maximum_retry_seconds"]))
+
+    def test_contract_and_implementations_share_literals(self) -> None:
+        sense = (ROOT / "Sense" / "internal" / "auditrelay" / "client.go").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        bell = (ROOT / "Bell" / "internal" / "audit" / "audit.go").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for marker in (
+            "/internal/v1/audit-events:batch",
+            "X-YoVision-Key-Id",
+            "X-YoVision-Timestamp",
+            "X-YoVision-Nonce",
+            "X-YoVision-Signature",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(marker, sense)
+            self.assertIn(marker, bell)
+        self.assertIn("10 * time.Second", sense)
+        self.assertIn("300*time.Second", (ROOT / "Sense" / "internal" / "auditrelay" / "worker.go").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()